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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to provide a consistent and comparable set of data on the trends in the provision of aid to 
agriculture over time within the framework of changes in the pattern of sectoral distribution of total 
development aid. Furthermore, it examines the factors, relating both to the agriculture sector itself and to 
the priorities and allocation processes of the total aid, which may account for the decline in aid to 
agriculture over the past two decades or more. It analyzes how in recent years the agricultural sector, as 
conventionally defined, and investments in the sector are increasingly incorporated in the new and wider 
concepts of food security and rural development as well as investments in them. In the end, the paper 
evaluates in the foregoing context the various commitments of the quantitative targets of aid made by the 
donors in the period following the post-2007 food crisis for agricultural development and food security. 
Keywords:  OECD/DAC classification, CRS, bilateral, multilateral, total aid, irrigation, poverty, 
aid priorities, food security, rural development, share of agriculture, share in GDP 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been much discussion about the causes of the slowdown in growth of 
agricultural production, especially in the context of the world food crisis, which severely hit developing 
countries in 2007 and 2008. The decline in agricultural investment, including a decline in the share of the 
agricultural sector in the aggregate investment, was considered to be a major contributing factor to this 
crisis. 
Two components of investment in agriculture have drawn particular attention as being of vital 
importance in this context. One is the trend in foreign aid to agriculture, and the other is the trend in 
domestic public expenditure on agriculture. This paper investigates the empirical evidence on the former 
issue. 
A review provides an opportunity to explore the criteria and considerations that influence the 
international donor community, both bilateral and multilateral, in determining the volume and pattern—
that is, the sectoral distribution—of aid.
1
These international deliberations and consequent appeals to both donors and recipients to increase 
expenditures on agriculture are based on two sets of assumptions: (1) the flow of aid to, as well as 
domestic public expenditures on, agriculture has been declining for the past two decades, and (2) the 
required amount of investment in agriculture (external and domestic) in developing countries must be 
greatly increased above the existing level. Regarding the latter assumption, it is estimated that this amount 
currently falls far short of the requirements necessary to meet the growing needs, especially in the 
developing world, of a rising population with an increasingly diversified food expenditure pattern, 
including a growing demand for livestock products. 
 An analysis of the external environment, as evidenced, for 
example, in the various international and UN conferences and meetings over the years, indicates how and 
to what extent they had an impact on the volume of aid and its priorities, such as aid to agriculture. In the 
aftermath of the 1973–1974 world food crisis, a major international conference was convened by the UN 
General Assembly on food and agriculture. During the 1990s, a number of international conferences of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and other food agencies culminating in the World 
Food Summit convened by the FAO in 1996 and its several follow-up meetings, called upon donor 
countries to increase the flow of aid to agriculture. Furthermore, the most recent meetings convened by 
G10 and G20 countries following the 2007–2008 world food crisis reiterated the appeal for more aid to 
agriculture. Simultaneously, all the conferences then and more recently called upon developing countries 
to increase the volume of their public expenditures on agriculture. 
Thus, the relevant questions regarding the trends in the flow of aid to agriculture are as follows: 
Has there been a decline in the absolute amount of aid? Has the share of aid to agriculture in the total aid 
declined, or is it constant? With an increase in total aid flow, a sharp decrease in the share of agriculture 
would result in a decline in the absolute amount of aid to agriculture; with a decrease in the total aid, the 
absolute amount of aid to agriculture would decrease even further if its share were to remain constant. 
Hence, it is important to analyze the share of agriculture in the total aid flow. Moreover, total aid is 
determined by a variety of political, economic, and strategic considerations, including the state of the 
world economy, as well as the economy of donor countries; it is the share of agriculture in the total aid 
that is relevant to determining the relative importance or priority attached to the agricultural sector by the 
donor community. After all, there is a limited amount of aid for which various sectors compete for their 
respective shares. In addition, there are few other issues which require analysis. What are the possible 
reasons for a decline in aid to agriculture over the years? How has the pattern or composition of aid to 
agriculture changed over the years and what are the implications thereof? What are the prospects and the 
rationale of increase in aid to agriculture in the future years, especially if it is considered in the wider 
context of food security and rural development?
                                                       
1 Aid stands for Official Development Assistance (ODA) throughout the paper. Total aid is overall aid, combined bilateral 
and multilateral, to all the sectors of an economy.  
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2.  TRENDS IN SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL AID AND  
SHARE OF AGRICULTURE 
Analysis of aid flows to agriculture in the context of the total aid flow during the past three or more 
decades is greatly hampered by the lack of complete, reliable, and consistent data. The only systematic 
data available for aid flows over time have been compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC). However, the easily accessible 
OECD/DAC website does not provide a consistent and comparable breakdown of aid flows from both 
multilateral and bilateral donors from the early 1970s to the present. This source provides a sectoral 
classification of aid flows from the 1970s onward only for the bilateral aid. The sectoral classification of 
the total aid flows, is available only from 1995.
2
Moreover, there are a few problems with the data that are available. First, the data available 
regarding aid to the agricultural sector from the OCED/DAC database, which includes agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries subsectors, do not provide any breakdown into three subsectors until 1994; from 
the mid-1990s onward, however, separate figures are provided for forestry, fisheries, and agriculture.  
  
Second, a category of “multisectoral” aid includes aid to more than one sector. It is not clear from 
the published data how much of this goes to the agricultural sector as distinguished from any other sector, 
even though the OECD/DAC database includes multisectoral aid in its definition of total “allocable 
sectors”; this may imply that in its detailed dataset (CRS) for individual countries, more details are 
available to classify these sectors. Third, one category of aid in both the OECD/DAC and CRS database is 
called “unallocable.” In other words, this category of aid cannot be classified by sector even from the 
OECD’s internal database (the CRS). Therefore, it is not known how much aid directly or indirectly goes 
to agriculture or any other sector. The share of total “sector allocable aid” in total bilateral aid varied 
between 55 percent in 1973–1975, 68 percent in 1994–1996 and 64 percent in 2006–2008.
3
The unallocated “unspecified” item varied between 10 and 27 percent of bilateral aid during the 
1970s and early 1980s; since the mid-1980s, this item was much lower, declining to about 2 percent by 
the late 2000s. The ratio of unspecified to total aid from 1995 to 2008 was between 1.1 and 2.3 percent. 
 The share of 
the “sector allocable aid” in the combined total bilateral and multilateral aid varied between 77 percent in 
1995–1996 and 70 percent in 2006–2008. The higher share of the “sector allocable aid” in the earlier 
period, that is 1995–1996, may have been due to the fact that the “unspecified item” in the category of 
unallocable aid became an increasingly smaller share in the latter period. This probably resulted from an 
improvement in accounting procedures. 
The sectoral distribution of the bilateral and total aid is shown in Tables 1 and 2, Figures 1–8, and 
Figures 12-19. Social infrastructure and services has accounted for the largest share in the bilateral as well 
as in the total aid. Its share in the bilateral aid has increased over time—from 20.7 percent in 1973–1975 
to 29.0 percent in 1994–1996. By 2006–2008, its share reached 38.0 percent. At the same time, the share 
of this sector in the total aid was 27.4 percent in 1995–1996 and it enjoyed an uninterrupted increase to 41 
percent in 2006–2008 (Figures 1 and 2).
                                                       
2 The only other recourse for making a sectoral classification of both bilateral and multilateral aid is to analyze the 
individual donor country data in the OECD’s credit reporting system (CRS). This would require examining the detailed country 
data, checking their classification, and ensuring their consistency. Delving into the details of the data available on the OECD 
website reveals inconsistencies and errors that can only be rectified by painstaking, time-consuming investigation of project-by-
project and donor-by-donor data that are available in the CRS—an exercise that can only be done by the OECD secretariat, the 
compiler of data from the donors. For example, in the OECD/DAC dataset, the subtotals of the aid shares of the subsectors 
(agriculture, forestry, and fishery) do not add up to the total figures given for the agricultural sector. The data from 1995 are 
available for total aid and its classification from the OECD website. A startling example of inconsistency in data relates to the 
relative amounts of bilateral and multilateral aid to agriculture. In some studies, such as von Braun et al., DFID 2004, as well as 
OECD documents from the early period until the mid-1990s, the share of multilateral aid to agriculture was shown to be much 
higher than bilateral aid, whereas some other, more recent sources provided the exactly contrary data. Their relative shares for all 
time periods were different—for example, bilateral aid was consistently higher than multilateral aid from the 1970s until 2008. 
3 Because of the year-to-year fluctuations in aid commitment, this discussion is based on two- or three-year averages. Aid 
commitments are spiking as the full value of the commitment is reported in the year it is made, irrespective of the duration of the 
project. For example, large-scale irrigation projects exacerbate this. When averaged over a three-year period, the flow of aid 
fluctuates less dramatically.   
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Table 1. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage) 
  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84  1985-87  1988-90  1991-93  1994-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
                           
I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  26.7  20.7  19.4  23.9  25.9  25.3  23.8  23.2  29.3  29.8  32.9  32.9  37.7 
I.1. Education  19.6  10.8  10.3  12.5  11.7  10.7  10.2  9.2  10.8  10.7  8.5  7.4  8.3 
I.2. Health  0.6  3.7  4.4  5.3  5.2  4.5  3.5  3.0  4.1  3.9  4.2  4.0  4.5 
I.3. Population Pol./Program & 
Reproductive Health  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.4  1.6  2.8  3.1  5.6 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation  1.8  1.8  1.4  1.8  2.9  3.3  3.7  4.3  5.8  5.4  4.5  4.1  4.6 
I.5. Government & Civil Society  1.3  2.0  1.0  1.3  2.1  2.6  2.4  2.8  3.1  3.8  6.7  10.2  10.9 
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services  3.3  2.4  2.3  2.9  3.9  3.3  3.1  3.0  4.2  4.4  6.2  4.1  3.9 
                           
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUC-
TURE & SERVICES  8.7  11.1  14.2  17.5  19.0  19.1  18.6  19.0  22.9  19.5  14.6  12.3  13.9 
II.1. Transport & Storage  3.9  3.4  4.6  8.3  7.0  7.1  7.5  7.6  10.5  8.8  7.6  4.4  5.7 
II.2. Communications  1.5  3.2  1.4  1.8  3.0  2.5  3.1  2.5  1.6  1.1  0.6  0.7  0.3 
II.3. Energy  3.3  4.3  7.3  7.2  8.4  7.7  6.2  7.4  8.4  6.7  3.8  5.1  4.3 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.1  0.3  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  1.0  2.1 
II.5. Business & Other Services  0.0  0.3  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.7  1.5  0.7  1.6  2.2  1.8  1.1  1.4 
                           
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS  9.2  20.6  21.1  25.9  22.3  18.5  15.4  12.8  11.4  9.2  7.4  5.6  5.8 
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing  3.9  7.5  9.5  12.1  11.4  11.9  9.3  7.6  8.1  6.7  5.4  3.3  3.9 
III.1.a. Agriculture  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.6  4.9  4.1  2.5  3.2 
III.1.b. Forestry  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5 
III.1.c. Fishing  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.2 
III.2. Industry, Mining, 
Construction  5.4  6.5  5.4  5.9  5.3  5.7  4.8  4.0  1.8  2.1  1.3  1.8  1.2 
                           
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-
CUTTING  0.6  2.2  2.4  2.2  4.7  2.0  2.9  3.6  4.8  7.2  7.4  6.8  6.2 
IV.1. General Environment 
Protection  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  2.0  2.7  1.6  2.1 
IV.2. Other Multisector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  4.9  4.7  5.3  4.1 
                           
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE 
(I+II+III+IV)  45.2  54.7  57.1  69.5  71.8  64.9  60.8  58.5  68.4  65.8  62.4  57.6  63.7 
                           
VI. COMMODITY AID / 
GENERAL PROGRAM 
ASSISTANCE 
28.2  14.9  14.4  11.5  12.4  21.1  16.7  15.6  6.3  6.6  6.2  3.5  4.1 
VI.1. General Budget Support  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.8  2.2  1.5  1.1  0.6  0.9  2.8 
VI.2. Development Food 
Aid/Food Security Assistance  19.7  10.0  8.8  5.4  5.1  7.1  4.3  3.2  2.1  2.5  2.8  1.3  1.2 
VI.3. Other Commodity 
Assistance  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  2.0  2.9  1.3  0.1  
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Table 1. Continued 
  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84  1985-87  1988-90  1991-93  1994-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
                           
VII. ACTION RELATING TO 
DEBT  6.4  2.8  4.3  3.9  1.4  2.4  11.2  10.2  8.2  8.3  10.2  20.7  13.8 
                           
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID  1.0  1.0  0.8  1.6  1.5  1.8  1.9  5.1  3.8  6.2  5.1  7.3  7.4 
VIII.1. Emergency Response  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  4.9  3.7  5.2  6.6 
VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & 
Rehabilitation  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6 
VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & 
Preparedness  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
                           
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF 
DONORS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  3.9  3.7  3.2  4.8  5.9  6.1  4.7  4.8 
                           
X. SUPPORT TO NGO’S  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  2.3  1.4  1.4  0.9  1.7  4.0  2.0  2.4 
                           
XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR 
COUNTRIES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.1  1.4  2.5  2.3  2.0 
                           
XII. UNALLOCATED / 
UNSPECIFIED  19.1  26.6  23.4  13.5  10.1  3.7  4.4  5.5  6.5  4.3  3.6  2.0  1.7 
                           
TOTAL (V + VI + VII + VIII + IX 
+ X + XI + XII)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Data from OECD/DAC database.   
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Table 2. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage)
1 
  1995–96  1997–99  2000–02  2003–05  2006–08 
           
I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES  27.4  30.3  34.8  36.6  40.7 
I.1. Education  5.7  7.4  7.5  7.7  7.9 
I.2. Health  4.5  4.9  4.9  5.0  5.8 
I.3. Population Pol./Program & Reproductive 
Health  1.8  2.5  3.3  4.0  6.2 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation  7.5  6.1  5.2  4.6  5.0 
I.5. Government & Civil Society  5.7  5.9  8.4  10.9  11.7 
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services  2.2  3.8  5.5  4.4  4.1 
           
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  27.8  22.7  18.2  14.2  15.7 
II.1. Transport & Storage  12.9  11.7  8.5  5.9  7.2 
II.2. Communications  1.4  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.4 
II.3. Energy  10.6  6.9  4.8  4.8  4.7 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services  1.3  1.3  2.0  1.5  1.9 
II.5. Business & Other Services  1.6  1.9  2.2  1.4  1.5 
           
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS  12.3  10.4  8.9  7.2  7.1 
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  9.8  7.7  5.9  4.3  4.7 
III.1.a. Agriculture  8.0  6.3  4.8  3.5  4.0 
III.1.b. Forestry  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4 
III.1.c. Fishing  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.2  0.2 
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction  2.2  2.4  2.2  2.2  1.5 
III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations  0.2  0.3  0.7  0.6  0.8 
III.3.b. Tourism  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
           
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING  9.2  9.1  7.9  6.3  6.8 
IV.1. General Environment Protection  3.7  2.5  2.3  1.5  2.0 
IV.2. Other Multisector  5.5  6.6  5.6  4.8  4.8 
           
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE (I+II+III+IV)  76.8  72.6  69.9  64.4  70.3 
           
VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL PROGRAM 
ASSISTANCE  9.4  8.6  8.1  5.1  5.2 
VI.1. General Budget Support  6.6  5.0  4.6  3.5  3.8 
VI.2. Development Food Aid/Food Security 
Assistance  1.7  2.7  3.2  1.4  1.1 
VI.3. Other Commodity Assistance  1.1  0.9  0.4  0.2  0.4 
           
VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  6.0  6.4  8.2  16.5  10.2 
           
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID  4.9  8.1  6.1  8.0  6.7 
VIII.1. Emergency Response  4.4  7.5  5.4  6.5  5.7 
VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation  0.5  0.6  0.7  1.5  0.8 
VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & Preparedness  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
           
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF DONORS  0.1  0.9  2.3  2.4  3.8 
           
X. SUPPORT TO NGO’S  0.6  0.6  2.4  0.8  1.3 
           
XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR COUNTRIES  0.5  0.4  1.2  1.5  1.5 
           
XII. UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED  1.7  2.5  1.8  1.4  1.1 
           
TOTAL (V+VI+VII+VIII+IX+X+XI+XII)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: OECD – DAC/CRS, various years. 
Note: 1 Total aid stands for the combined total of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
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The health and education components of the social infrastructure and services had consistently 
large shares in both the bilateral as well as in the total aid. The share of both health and education together 
was 10 percent of the total aid in 1995–1996, increasing to about 14 percent in 2006–2008, with the share 
of aid to education being consistently higher than that of health. In 1995–1996, the share of education was 
5.7 percent, whereas that of health was 4.5 percent; in 2006–2008, their respective shares were 8 percent 
and 6 percent (Figures 1 and 2).  
Figure 1. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Social infrastructure and services, 
education, and health 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.  
Figure 2. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Social infrastructure and services, 
education, and health 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
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The population component did not exist until 1982–1984 and continued to be low during the rest 
of 1980s; it then increased from 1.8 percent of the total aid in 1994–1996, reaching reached 6.2 percent by 
2006–2008. Likewise, the share of water supply and sanitation was very low during the 1980s and started 
to increase by the 1990s, reaching 7.5 percent in the total aid in 1995–1996 and then declined to 5.0 
percent in 2006–2008. The most significant increase was in the government and civil society component 
of social infrastructure and services; its share of the total aid was about 6.0 percent in 1995–1996. By the 
early 2000s, it exceeded the shares of all other components in the social sector, reaching about 12 percent 
in total aid in 2006–2008 (Figures 3 and 4). 
Figure 3. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Social infrastructure and services, 
population and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.  
Figure 4. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Social infrastructure and services, 
population and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, and government and civil society 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
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The share of economic infrastructure and services throughout was lower than that of social 
infrastructure and services, the former’s share in bilateral aid increased from 11 percent in 1973–1975 to 
23 percent in 1994–1996 and then started to decline and it was 14 percent in 2006–2008. It reached 27.8 
percent of the total aid in 1995–1996 and thereafter started to decline consistently, reaching about 16 
percent in 2006–2008. The three important components of the economic infrastructure and services sector 
were storage and transport, communications, and energy, which increased their share of the bilateral aid 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and then started to decline. However, their share in the total aid declined 
from 29.4 percent in 1995–1996 to 12.3 percent in 2006–2008 (Figures 5 and 6).
4
Figure 5. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Economic infrastructure and services, 
transport and storage, and communications 
  
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
Figure 6. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Economic infrastructure and services, 
transport and storage, and communications 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
                                                       
4 In a large part of the economic infrastructure and services sector, which was dominated by the public sector until the 
1990s, the private sector increasingly became important, including foreign direct investment in such areas as communications and 
energy. This may partly explain the declining role of aid. An increasing role of the private sector also explains a significant 
decline over time in the share of aid going to industries, mining, and construction.  
8 
The share of the production sector, meaning agriculture, industry and mining, and trade policies 
and tourism, in the bilateral aid increased until mid-1990s when it was 23 percent, and then it started to 
decline. Its share in the total aid was 12.3 percent in 1995–1996, dropping to 7.1 percent in 2006–2008 
(Figures 7 and 8).  
Figure 7. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Production sectors; agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing; and industry, mining, and construction 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
Figure 8. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Production sectors; agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing; and industry, mining, and construction 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
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The share of aid to agriculture in total aid increased from 13.0 percent in 1973–1975 to about 23 
percent in 1979–1981, the highest share reached throughout the period from 1973 to 2008. The 1974 
World Food Conference in the aftermath of the 1973–1974 world food crisis seemed to have contributed 
to the increase in aid to agriculture in this period. From the mid-1980s onward, the share of aid to 
agriculture started to decline continuously, until it reached 5.5 percent during 2003–2005; it then 
increased to 6.0 percent in 2006–2008 (Figures 9–11 and Tables 3 and 4).
5
Sector-wise unallocable aid includes commodity and general program assistance (general budget 
support, development food aid and food security assistance, and other commodity assistance), 
humanitarian aid (emergency response, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation, disaster prevention and 
preparedness), support to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and action relating to debt, refugees in 
donor countries, administrative costs, and “unspecified” aid.  
 Multisector/ crosscutting aid 
starting from a very insignificant base, aid started to increase its share during the 1990s. Its share in 
bilateral aid was about 4 percent in 1991–1993 and 6 percent in 2006–2008, whereas its share in the total 
aid varied between 9 and 7 percent in the 2000s. The increase in multisector aid was partly due to an 
increasing emphasis on interdependence among sectors and the synergistic effects of development in one 
sector on the other. Environmental protection emerged as a new component during the mid-1990s and 
2000s (Figures 12 and 13). 
Figure 9. Aid to agricultural, bilateral, multilateral, and bilateral plus multilateral, 3-year average, 
US$ million (constant prices of 2007)  
 
Source: OECD/CRS, various years. 
                                                       
5 The percentage share of aid to agriculture given in Tables 3 and 4 does not conform to the shares of aid to agriculture in 
Table 2 because the data for Tables 1 and 2 are taken from OECD/DAC database whereas the data for Tables 3–4 and Figures 9–
11 are taken from Credit Reporting System (CRS) which do not exactly conform to each other. The discrepancy is especially 
significant in the case of total aid. The OECD publications relating to aid to agriculture, use the CRS data rather than the 
OECD/DAC data. This is especially because CRS data provide both multilateral and bilateral aid for all the years from 1970s. 
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Multilateral  
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Figure 10. Total aid to all sectors, 3-year average, US$ million (constant prices of 2007)  
 
Source: OECD/CRS, various years.   
Figure 11. Share of bilateral, multilateral, and bilateral plus multilateral aid to agriculture in total 
aid to all sectors (percentage) 
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Table 3. Aid to agriculture, bilateral, multilateral, and total aid, US$ million, 3-year average (constant prices of 2007) 












5475.2000  8773.1304  11355.8750  12178.4240  11370.9420  11129.1700  7818.8940  7507.9206  5977.1966  5330.4400  5055.2555  6256.0000 
Total aid to 
all sectors   42461.6330  46212.221  50528.9600  54922.8020  59877.9430  71021.3140  69686.0490  64607.8170  60653.7690  65412.4970  92946.3030  104753.9100 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.    
Table 4. Share of bilateral and multilateral agricultural aid in total aid to all sector (percentage) 








4.998  8.865  9.288  10.114  6.534  5.942  3.419  3.583  3.222  2.757  2.189  2.167 
Bilateral plus 
multilateral aid   12.894  18.984  22.474  22.174  18.990  15.670  11.220  11.621  9.855  8.149  5.439  5.972 
Total aid to all 
sectors  
100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
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Figure 12. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Multisector/crosscutting and general 
environmental protection 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
Figure 13. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Multisector/crosscutting and general 
environment protection 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.  
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Commodity aid and general program assistance, which was an important sector of aid from the 
early 1970s and to early 1990s (ranging between 12 and 21 percent of bilateral aid), declined during the 
next decade reaching about 4 percent in 2006–2008; however, its share which was 9.4 percent of the total 
aid in 1995–1996 dropped to 5.2 percent in 2006–2008. Development food was an important component 
of commodity and general program assistance up to 1980s and declined in importance during the 1990s 
and 2000s. By 2006–2008, its share in the total aid declined to 1.1 (Figures 14 and 15).  
Figure 14. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Commodity aid/general program 
assistance, general budget support, and development food aid/food security assistance 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
Figure 15. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Commodity aid/general program 
assistance, general budget support, and development food aid/food security assistance 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.    
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General budget support, which was relatively unimportant component of program assistance 
during the 1980s, increased its share in the total aid during the 1990s up to about 7 percent but 
subsequently declined to about 4 percent in 2006–2008. Under this form of aid, resources are placed at 
the disposal of governments to meet the overall deficiency of revenue resources, without earmarking the 
aid for any sector. Instead, it is left up to recipient governments to allocate among sectors and purposes of 
aid, with some broad objectives usually agreed upon by the donors and the recipient governments. Thus, 
it is not possible to allocate such aid to any one sector.  
Similarly, humanitarian aid became important during the 1990s and 2000s, as was the case with 
aid to NGOs. Its share in the total aid increased from 4.9 percent in 1995–1996 to 6.7 percent in 2006–
2008.  
An important item that emerged in the 1990s was assistance provided to repay or cancel old debt 
in response to debt repayment problems faced by developing countries. The share of this aid ranged from 
6 percent to about 17 percent of total aid during the mid-1990s and 2000s; it was a higher percentage of 
bilateral aid, ranging from 10 percent to 21 percent between the early 1990s and early 2000s (Figures 16 
and 17). 
Figure 16. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Humanitarian aid, support to NGOs, and 
refugees in donor countries 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.   
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Figure 17. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Humanitarian aid, support to NGOs, 
and refugees in donor countries 
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.  
Figure18. Sectoral distribution of total aid (percentage): Administrative costs of donors and 
unallocated/unspecified costs  
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.    
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Figure 19. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (percentage): Administrative costs of donors and 
unallocated/unspecified costs  
 
Source: OECD/DAC and OECD/CRS, various years.    
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3.  PATTERN OF AID TO AGRICULTURE: SUBSECTORAL COMPOSITION 
To better understand the trend in the flow of aid to agriculture, it is necessary to examine the detailed 
composition of this aid and how and why the pattern of aid to agriculture has changed over time. Data on 
the distribution of aid among the different agricultural subsectors are difficult to obtain. The following is 
an attempt to compile, for some discrete years and mostly from secondary sources, the composition of aid 
to the agricultural sector. The classification into various subsectors is not strictly comparable over time. A 
few selected subsectors of aid to agriculture for various years taken from different sources have been 
grouped to make them as broadly comparable as possible (Table 5). 
Agricultural land and water development and management constituted the biggest share of aid to 
agriculture from the 1980s to 2008. For example, the share of irrigation was around 26 percent in the 
1980s; it varied between 19 percent and 39 percent during early the 1990s and between 18 percent and 20 
percent during the 2000s.
6
Agricultural water resources development includes irrigation, reservoirs, hydraulic structures, and 
groundwater exploitation. Easy accessibility to water is of paramount importance for increasing food and 
agricultural production. Also, there has been an increasing demand for water for multiple uses, including 
agricultural production. The fear of future water scarcity has also generated a great deal of concern. In 
addition, climate change might aggravate the regional and temporal variability of water. An increase in 
water scarcity might cause interstate or interregional conflicts and thus threaten peace and security. In 
recent years, these considerations have made investments in increasing and managing water supply 
crucial for future food supply. However, at the same time, the complexity of formulating water resource 
and irrigation projects suited to diverse agroecological circumstances has increased due to the recent 
emphasis on the environmental and social implications (such as resettlement of displaced persons) of such 
projects, especially for large-scale irrigation projects. This has the effect of slowing down the process of 
formulation of water resources projects and as a consequence the process of the donors’ evaluation and 
approval of project requests.  
  
Many donors do not favor large-scale irrigation projects involving reservoirs and dams, because 
they are not considered to be the most practical water management systems for poor farmers, especially 
those most likely affected by climate change and water scarcity in the coming years. Accordingly, there 
has been a shift toward a preference for small-scale projects. However, success in implementing small-
scale irrigation projects, either groundwater or surface water, requires collective action on the part of the 
farmers in the allocation and appropriate pricing of water among farming households (OECD 1987). This 
condition poses a challenge of social and political engineering that is not easily met in traditional 
societies.
7
The classification system in the OECD database and other specialized studies did not differentiate 
between small-scale microirrigation and large-scale irrigation and storage and reservoir systems. It was, 
therefore, not possible to monitor the consequences of the generally perceived shift from new, large-scale 
irrigation investment toward either (1) rehabilitation and improved management of current systems or (2) 
small-scale, community-managed system. Similarly, it was unclear whether aid was used for capital or 
recurrent costs, both of which are key issues in irrigation development policy with significant 
implications for project sustainability.  
  
Aid for the purchase, marketing, and distribution of agricultural inputs, including fertilizer, 
suffered a decline over time, because this activity was considered more appropriate for the private sector.  
 
                                                       
6 During the 2000s, for which period data on the breakdown between land and water subsectors are available, there was a 
decline in the share of land development and an increase in the share of irrigation or agricultural water resources. 
7 These factors may explain why aid to irrigation has not expanded at the rate that is warranted by its importance for both 
agriculture and adaptation to prospective climate change.  
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Table 5. Pattern of distribution of aid to agriculture 
  1978  1981–81 




               
               
Appraisal of agricultural resources  0.17  0.19 
19.4  39.0 
Agricultural land resources  5.6  2.0 
Development & management of 
agricultural resources  26.62  25.52  Agricultural water resources  19.3  18.0 
               
Supply of agricultural production 
inputs  1.66  2.84 
3.0  6.8  Agricultural inputs  4.7  2.0 
Supply of fertilizers  4.99  5.67 
               
Crop production  11.65  11.45  11.9  5.1 
Food crops production  4.3  7.0 
Industrial/export crops  2.3  3.0 
               
Livestock development  4.99  3.75  1.5  3.4  Livestock  3.7  2.0 
               
Agricultural training & extension  3.33  2.43 
9.0  10.2 
Extension  1.5  6.0 
Agricultural research  3.33  5.78 
Education/training  1.6  2.0 
Agricultural research  6.9  10.0 
               
Agricultural services  19.97  17.12  16.4  6.8 
Agricultural services  5.4  3.0 
Protection / pest  0.9  0.0 
Financial services  0.0  1.0 
Agricultural cooperatives  0.7  1.0 
Livestock/veterinary services  0.0  1.0 
               
Agricultural unallocated  23.29  25.25  38.8  28.8  Agricultural policy and administration  21.9  22.0 
          Agricultural development  16.7  13.0 
          Agrarian reform  2.0  1.0 
          Alternative development  2.6  6.0 
               
TOTAL  100.00  100.00  100.0  100.0  TOTAL1  100.0  100.0 
Sources: For 2005–2008 average, ONE 2009; for 1995–2007 average, Oxfam Briefing Paper 2009; for 1990–1995: FAO 2000; for 1978 and 1980–1981, OECD 1983. 
Notes: For 1990 and 1995: these items (for example, agricultural policy and administration, and so on) are assumed to be included in agriculture and others; same is assumed to be 
true for 1978 and 1980-81. 
1 The average figures for 2005–2007 probably include financial and livestock services as a component of agricultural services, whereas plan protection and pest control could be 
included in agricultural services in the figures for 2005–2008.  
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The same was true for crop production of export and foodcrops, the share of which (in 
agricultural aid) declined from around 11 percent during the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s to 5.1 
percent in 1995. However, an increase of its share to 6 percent in the latter part of the 1990s and early 
2000s was not easily explained, unless aid to the sector was assumed to include policies in support of 
foodcrops, such as subsidies and price support programs. The definition of crop production aid in the 
OECD classification system leaves room for ambiguity. In the earlier days, it probably referred to the 
parastatals involved not only in the production of food and, most important, export crops, but also in 
providing necessary inputs and reliable outlets for farms (OECD 1998).  
The share of agricultural research went up significantly, from 3.3 percent during the late 1970s, to 
5.8 percent in the early 1980s, to 7 percent in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and to 10 percent in the late 
2000s, which was the highest share in the three decades. Support for bilateral research declined and was 
replaced, to some extent, by aid channeled multilaterally, such as through the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
The share of extension and training in agricultural aid was smaller—around 2.5 and 3.2 percent 
during the 1980s and 1990s. This share increased to only 8.0 percent in 2005–2008. The 1980s did see a 
period of great enthusiasm and high hopes for the “visit and training” system of extension; however, this 
system was subsequently abandoned, as high expectations were not fulfilled and this, therefore, had a 
dampening effect on aid. During the 1990s and 2000s, various experiments and innovative approaches for 
designing “extension and training” systems were attempted in different countries and adjusted to the 
circumstances of each country. Some attempts involved farmers and farmers’ groups to link them with the 
extension and research in an interactive way. There was some increase in aid to finance these innovative 
approaches. The field of extension and training required considerable investment in local resources, 
because it was extremely manpower intensive, requiring large current expenditures, such as salaries and 
benefits. Thus it was not an ideal scope for foreign aid, except for financing the training of “trainers” 
abroad. 
The share of agricultural services of all kinds in agricultural aid was around 17 to 20 percent 
during the 1980s, but declined to 8.7 percent in the 1990s, and then to around 5 percent during the 2000s. 
In the absence of data, it is not possible to analyze changes over time in the different types of services as 
recipients of aid. This decline in the share of services occurred because many of the services—such as 
marketing and distribution of inputs and outputs, supply of agricultural credit, cooperatives, and so on—
had been, or were intended to be, taken over or transferred to the private sector.
8
The provision of aid for agricultural credit to farmers, including the strengthening of credit 
institutions, was important in the 1970s and 1980s. However, problems soon arose with the effective 
delivery of credit. The fear of loss, defaults, or non-repayment due to crop failures or a fall in prices 
constrained the sustainability of the credit institutions. Many countries that had a policy of subsidizing 
agricultural credit in the professed interest of small farmers ended up giving loans to large farmers 
instead, often for nonagricultural purposes. The defaults of loans advanced by government-owned credit 
institutions were compensated by government subsidies and frequent writing off of debts. This policy, in 
turn, often encouraged the habit of defaults and, as a consequence, endangered the viability of credit 
institutions. This experience adversely affected the inflow of aid in support of agricultural credit. In later 
years, the objectives and processes of aid for agricultural credit were reconsidered. It was recognized that 
it might be sensible to initially use agricultural credit to avoid or repay consumer debt as well as to 
combine finance for farm and nonfarm rural activities (including rural industries). The logic was that 
farmers usually combine farm and nonfarm activities, especially with the diversification of the rural 
economy. Instead of agricultural credit focused on a special commodity or purpose, there was an attempt 
to broaden and widen the provision of the rural financial services in general, providing multiple types of 
  
                                                       
8 It is questionable whether the shift of many essential agricultural services from the public to the private sector, which was 
part of a general trend during the 1990s and 2000s, was justifiable in all countries at all times or all stages of development 
without appropriate sequencing. However, as subsequent experience demonstrated in quite a few countries without institutional 
frameworks for rapid development of the private-sector capacity, this policy led to a decline in the quantity and efficiency of 
agricultural services.   
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rural credit. The design of such viable, efficient institutions took time and hence slowed the flow of aid. 
Experiments with pilot schemes were often performed before an institution or mechanism could be 
selected for adoption on a large scale. This process inevitably took time. 
Assistance to cooperatives and producer organizations—often a vehicle or mechanism for the 
provision and effective use of aid—is considered vital for involving farmers in the design and 
dissemination of new farming techniques, including the use of inputs, adjusting where appropriate to local 
circumstances. Empowerment of farmers is intended to ensure a greater transparency, accountability, and 
responsiveness to the needs of the local population on the part of the government institutions that provide 
at the local level agricultural services, such as credit, marketing, and extension. In recent years, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and farmers’ associations are 
increasingly considered as supplements to government institutions or even as alternatives in cases of 
market and state failures. Both these sets of institutions (NGOs and CSOs), though viable and efficient, 
take time to evolve and to absorb large amounts of aid.  
The post-1995 period recorded an increase in two relatively new items of agricultural aid: (1) 
agricultural policy and administration and (2) alternative development. The first subsector, according to 
the OECD, included agricultural sector policy, planning and programs, aid to agricultural ministries, 
institutional capacity building, and advice. It was intended to build institutions and human capital for 
designing national agricultural policies and programs; increasing the supply, quality, and rurality (rural 
orientation) of scarce skills and institutional capacity; improving national food information systems to 
collect, process, and use reasonably timely and reliable data for policymaking purposes; and improving 
coordination of aid with national investment programs at the country level (OECD 1987). These concerns, 
initially expressed in the late 1980s, continued to be significant in the 1990s and 2000s, especially in the 
low-income developing world (World Bank 2007).  
The task of designing and formulating agricultural projects has increased in complexity over time, 
as several new elements are incorporated in such projects. The new components include, for example, 
environmental impact assessment, including adequate soil and land surveys; involvement of the 
prospective beneficiaries in the design and implementation of projects, with the assistance, wherever 
needed, of local farmers’ groups, including women and NGOs, in the formulation and implementation of 
projects as they play an important role in producing and marketing agricultural crops. 
The second item—alternative development—includes projects aimed at reducing illicit drug 
cultivation by diverting farmers toward the production and marketing of alternative crops or agriculture-
related activities. This activity has assumed an increasing importance in view of the considerable illegal 
drug trafficking within and across countries.  
The other two items—agrarian reform insofar it includes land ownership and tenancy reforms as 
well as agricultural development—have been the traditional items for the provision of aid. According to 
OECD database, agrarian reform comprises agricultural sector “adjustment” programs, as well as 
agricultural development, including farm development and integrated development projects. The lack of 
data does not permit an examination of the relative changes over time in aid to the specific types of 
agrarian reform and agricultural development. The above-mentioned four types of aid are lumped together 
in Table 5 and aid for each type cannot be distinguished. These four types of agricultural aid amounted to 
around 40 percent of total agricultural aid during the late 1990s to mid-2000s. This compares with the 
sum of unallocated items in the years from 1980s to mid-1990s, an increase by about 35–40 percent. 
The data on the composition of agricultural aid in greater details for two time periods in the 2000s 
broadly confirm the conclusions drawn from data over the longer period, even though the two sets of data 
are not strictly comparable (Table 6). For example, the percentage of agricultural aid going to (a)  
agricultural policy and administrative management and (b) agricultural development together accounted 
for 35 to 42 percent for both bilateral and multilateral aid, even though the former (a) had a greater share 
of multilateral aid than the latter (b). Similarly, aid for land and water resources was second in importance 
in both bilateral and multilateral aid with water resources development taking precedence over land 
management. The share of aid for alternative development increased significantly over the 2000s 
confirming what is indicated in Table 5; it was more important in bilateral aid than in multilateral aid. The  
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share of agricultural extension increased during the 2000s in both bilateral and multilateral aid. There 
were differences between bilateral and multilateral aid in respect of aid for agricultural extension and 
education. Aid for agricultural extension had a greater importance in multilateral aid than in bilateral aid, 
whereas the aid for education and training was relatively more important in multilateral than in bilateral 
aid. Agricultural research constituted a larger share of bilateral than of multilateral aid. Aid for 
agricultural services was more important for multilateral aid than for bilateral aid. Therefore, the pattern 
of aid in the two sets of data (Tables 5 and 6) generally confirms each other. However, there are some 
differences in respect of their item-wise priorities between bilateral and multilateral aid. 
Table 6. Composition of aid to agriculture (2000–2003 and 2005–2008) 
  Total Bilateral  Total Multilateral 
2000–2003  2005–2008  2000–2003  2005–2008 
Agricultural policy and administrative 
management  26.3%  17.7%  29.3%  28.8% 
Agricultural development  15.6%  16.1%  13.5%  6.9% 
Agricultural land resources  8.7%  2.8%  2.0%  1.6% 
Agricultural water resources  14.5%  17.4%  21.3%  18.0% 
Agricultural inputs  6.2%  2.3%  0.2%  0.7% 
Food crop production  3.9%  4.8%  9.8%  10.1% 
Industrial crops/export crops  1.8%  1.2%  1.0%  6.3% 
Livestock  1.8%  1.1%  4.0%  4.2% 
Agrarian reform  1.0%  1.5%  0.0%  0.6% 
Agricultural alternative development  1.7%  9.6%  0.0%  0.3% 
Agricultural extension  1.4%  2.4%  5.5%  11.1% 
Agricultural education/training  2.6%  2.8%  0.1%  0.1% 
Agricultural research  7.6%  14.7%  3.0%  1.8% 
Agricultural services  1.3%  2.0%  4.5%  5.6% 
Plant/post-harvest protection and pest 
control  0.8%  0.6%  1.2%  0.2% 
Agricultural financial services  2.8%  1.0%  3.1%  1.7% 
Agricultural cooperatives  1.2%  1.1%  0.6%  0.6% 
Livestock/veterinary services  0.7%  0.9%  0.9%  1.4% 
Source: Coppard 2009. 
In sum, there was a change in the composition of agricultural aid. Thus, the decline in the share of 
agriculture in the total aid was partly explained by changes over time in the priorities in respect of the 
item-wise composition of aid to agriculture. For example, on the one hand, there was a decline in the 
share in aid of such items as supply of inputs, small-scale irrigation, selected agricultural services, and 
crop production; on the other hand, there was an increase in aid for the prevention of illicit drugs, which 
often achieved limited success in expanding alternative crops, as well as for institution building and 
capacity improvement, which was a slow process and did not absorb large absolute amounts of aid.  
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4.  DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON AID PRIORITIES 
Starting in the late 1970s and 1980s, the central objective of development strategy was poverty 
alleviation. Poverty was conceived not only in terms of income poverty but also in terms of the social and 
human dimensions of poverty. Similarly, the emphasis shifted to the broader concepts of food security 
and human and social development. Food security was conceived in terms of not only adequate and stable 
food supplies in the aggregate but also access to basic food for all, especially the poor, the disadvantaged, 
and marginalized populations. Human development was conceived to include not only a reduction in 
income poverty but also an increased access to nutrition and education, reproductive health, and family-
planning services, as well as safety net measures and social protection.  
Once the multiple dimensions of poverty came to the forefront of international consensus among 
development thinkers and the aid community, it was agreed that in order to alleviate poverty, income 
growth had to be supplemented by the alleviation of nonincome dimensions of poverty through 
investment in education, health, and nutrition. Furthermore, it was emphasized that not only were health 
and education independent dimensions of investment in human development and poverty reduction, but 
also they had a positive impact on, or contributed significantly to, the increase in agricultural output and 
income. A healthy worker is a productive worker and can attend regularly to farm work without being 
hobbled by disease, such as malaria and tuberculosis. These diseases debilitate and sap the energy of the 
farm labor and reduce productivity. The devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on the quality and quantity of 
labor supply due to premature death and debilitation of capacity, especially of young workers and of 
technical and professional personnel, have been amply recorded.  
Similarly, a literate farmer with primary education is proficient in adopting new technologies; he 
can follow well written instructions on improved farming techniques and appropriate cropping patterns, 
use of inputs, and irrigation methods. Thus, the effectiveness of extension and training services is greatly 
enhanced when farmers are literate, and it is even better if they have primary education. Accordingly, 
investment in health and education not only constitutes core components of human and social 
development but also contributes to agricultural growth. 
Simultaneous with the emphasis on poverty alleviation and social development as the central 
objectives of development strategy, a series of international and UN conferences, starting in the 1980s 
and continuing into the 1990s and 2000s, focused on various individual components or aspects of social 
and human development, such as primary health, drinking water supply and sanitation, child mortality, 
family planning, population, and education. These conferences led to a consensus among the international 
development community, including both aid recipients and donors as deserving priority attention. 
Subsequently, many of those components were incorporated in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).
9
During this period, the various OECD Development Cooperation reports analyzed how the 
international consensus on these development goals guided the donors’ formulation of aid strategy. Each 
resolution and goal of the international development community included arrangements for periodic 
reviews, including monitoring and evaluation of progress in achieving these goals. In its annual reviews, 
the OECD/DAC (as the coordination forum for all donors) occasionally elaborated on the types and 




                                                       
9 Seven of the eight development goals are (1) eradication of extreme hunger and poverty; (2) universal primary education; 
(3) reduction of child mortality; (4) improvement of maternal health; (5) combating malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases; (6) 
gender equality and empowerment of women; and (7) environmental sustainability including safe drinking water and urban slum 
improvement. Agricultural investment to increase food supply in this context was considered an important pathway, but only in 
those developing countries in which the majority of the population depended on agriculture for reducing hunger. 
 At the same time, the OECD/DAC periodically reviewed in its annual reports 
the donors’ performance of aid provision with a view to promoting these goals. 
10 The observations of the OECD/DAC reports during the early 2000s illustrate the evolution of the development 
community’s understanding of the contributions of the various social sector components to the development objectives. “Primary 
education continues to be the most effective instrument for pro-poor growth in developing countries, while returns decline at  
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As stated earlier, and as confirmed by the international consensus, the economic and social 
infrastructure and services sectors continued to have the largest share of aid right from the early days. 
Because these two sectors provided the public goods and services that were unlikely to be provided by the 
private sector, the responsibility of the public sector and government to provide these public goods was 
recognized. Unlike foreign private investment, foreign aid was primarily government-to-government 
assistance; thus, it was expected, right from the beginning, that foreign assistance would contribute 
significantly to the financing of such public goods. This was particularly true for social infrastructure and 
services, such as education, health, population, and reproductive health programs, as well as water and 
sanitation. Following deliberations on the criteria and goals in the social sector, the donor community not 
only extended aid for the health and education sector but also increased the share of primary health and 
basic education in the aggregate. Accordingly, from 1996 to 2005, the share of basic health in the 
assistance to health sector increased from 15 to 25 percent, while the share of primary education in the aid 
to education sector increased from 15 percent to about 50 percent (OECD 2004). 
Aid for strengthening government institutions and humanitarian assistance increasingly 
constituted important elements of international consensus. There was an increasing realization during the 
1990s and 2000s that good governance was essential for an efficient use of development resources. The 
attention of the development community was drawn to the importance of ensuring and promoting the 
efficiency of government agencies in formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating 
development programs and policies. At the same time, major importance was attached to the integrity and 
control of corruption in the use of public resources.  
Humanitarian aid, in response to national and human-made disasters and relief operations, was on 
the rise due to increasing incidences of such occasions and to a recognition that the international 
community had an important role in mitigating the adverse effects of such circumstances. Aid to the civil 
society—that is, institutions that promoted people’s participation in development—increased in 
importance during the 1990s and 2000s. This was partly in recognition of both the development and 
humanitarian roles increasingly played by civil society and grassroots organizations. Also, in many 
recipient countries with weak governments, they provided valuable services in supplementing the efforts 
of the national administrative and implementation agencies. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
higher levels of schooling and increased investment in tertiary education is critical for banking, trade, and investment activities” 
(OECD, 2001).  
The demographic gift “comes about as population growth declines, thus reducing the share of the population below working 
age; with the more of the population working, growth increases. The demographic gift in turn calls attention to the implication of 
the decline. This includes girl’s education and access to reproductive health care” (OECD 1993). 
A key reason that growth rates in tropical countries are likely to be low is those countries have a high incidence of “death 
and debilitation from tropical diseases, for example, malaria and cholera, that cannot propagate themselves as effectively in 
climates with cold winters. There is now a well-documented capacity to fight these diseases, as well as tuberculosis and other 
diseases of poverty that also strike temperate climates. That capacity needs to be extended to other poor countries and regions” 
(OECD 2000). 
Aid that assists general economic development, including aid to support economic stabilization, policy reforms, and 
adjustments to public expenditure priorities, can have a wide impact on the access of poor people to basic education, primary 
health care, and family planning services (OECD 2004).  
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5.  POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DECLINE IN AID TO AGRICULTURE 
The absolute amount of the total aid to agriculture in real terms (constant prices of 2007) increased from 
the early 1970s to the late 1980s and early 1990s; it then started to decline until 2003–2005. The volume 
of bilateral aid to agriculture continued to increase until 1985–1987 and then started to decline. The 
decline in multilateral aid to agriculture between 1982–1984 and 1985–1987 was steep enough to more 
than offset the rise in bilateral aid for that period, so that both types of aid together started to decline from 
1985–1987 onwards.
11
In light of the foregoing review and analysis of the trends in aid to agriculture during the last 
several decades, one can provide an overview regarding the various possible reasons for the phenomenon. 
In the context of information available to date, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign relative 
importance or weight to the various contributing factors. 
 At the same time, the total aid to all sectors in constant prices of 2007 continued to 
rise until 1988–1990 and then underwent a decline until 2003–2005; however, it increased by 10 percent 
between 2003–2005 and 2006–2008. Thus, the rise and fall in the aid to agriculture followed broadly the 
same pattern as that in total aid to all sectors (Tables 3 and 4). Similarly, the share of aid to agriculture in 
the total aid increased until 1982–1984 and then started to decline on a continuous basis until 2003–2005; 
it then recorded an increase by about 10 percent in 2006–2008. Thus, the rise and fall in the share of aid 
to agriculture in total aid followed the same pattern as the rise and fall in total aid, with the exception that 
for a brief period between 1982–1984 and 1988–1990 the share of aid to agriculture continued its decline 
even when total aid was on the rise (Tables 3 and 4).  
The evolution of international consensus on the priorities of aid from the late 1980s to the present 
(as discussed earlier) placed agriculture as only one—albeit an important one—of the interrelated and 
mutually supportive components of a broad program of economic as well as social and human 
development and poverty alleviation. It was in this context that the World Food Summit in 1995 stated 
two broad guidelines for government investments and foreign aid in agriculture. First, more had to be 
invested in the human skills and institutional capacities of government so as to be able to interact 
fruitfully with the millions of private individuals on whose willingness to invest the growth of food 
supply ultimately depends. Second, despite much government effort within the agricultural sector, 
progress would be limited unless appropriate policy signals were also given at the national level to private 
individuals. Thus, a consensus emerged that what was crucial for growth in the agricultural sector were 
policies, institutions, and incentives that encouraged farmers to save and invest, while investments in 
supporting sectors, such as economic and social infrastructure, should be provided by the public sector to 
enhance the profitability of investments in farming. At the same time, it was recognized that certain 
investments within the agricultural sector were in the nature of public goods; the private sector would be 




                                                       
11 The distinction between nominal and real terms is often made in order to underscore the point that an increase in nominal 
aid may simply reflect a rise in prices, whereas the real value of aid in terms of physical goods and services may fall if the rise in 
prices more than offsets the increase in aid in nominal prices. Although this is a legitimate way of looking at real aid for 
analytical purposes, it is not how policymakers and donors make decisions from year to year on budgets, public expenditures, and 
foreign aid (which is part of public expenditures). Donors and recipients make decisions based on nominal values and prices. 
When the donor community is exhorted to provide 0.7 percent of gross national product (GNP) as aggregate development 
assistance over a period of time, it is understood by policymakers to be in nominal terms. Because it is assumed that the donor 
country’s GNP is most likely to rise in the medium to long term, a fixed ratio of aid-to-GNP of 0.7 percent would always imply a 
rise in aid in nominal terms. However, by measuring the conversion of aid flow from nominal to real terms, a pressure may be 
exerted on donors to increase nominal aid; otherwise they would have done so in order to compensate for a rise in prices. In the 
Appendix, movements in aid flows are shown in nominal prices, as well for comparison with those in real prices. 
12 These include, for example, as explained later, research, extension and training, land preparation and reclamation, 
drainage, and irrigation. Large-scale irrigation requires public investment, whereas small-scale irrigation requires collective 
action, which needs to be facilitated by the government. This approach became widely accepted during the late 1990s and 2000s  
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Increasing Recognition of Supporting and Supplementary Role of Rural Infrastructure: 
Physical and Social 
Experience has shown that investment in infrastructure when they are provided to serve the rural areas 
such as rural roads, transport, communications, and energy, and so on was essential for increasing food 
and agricultural production and to facilitate rural-urban linkages. Access to markets for outputs and inputs 
as well as adequate and timely information about their prices determines farmers’ decisions to produce 
and invest. The high return of investment—for example, in rural roads and rural electrification—on rural 
income growth and poverty reduction have been amply demonstrated in recent times.
13
While alleviation of the non-income dimensions of poverty—such as equitable access to such 
services as health (basic health and primary health services), education (primary education and adult 
literacy), and nutrition (nutritional supplementations, impact of child and maternal mortality)—was high 
on the development agenda, it was at the same time recognized that investment in social sector such as 
education and health, not only directly promoted human and social underdevelopment, but also to 
indirectly stimulated agricultural growth and income growth—via improvement in labor productivity and 
output. 
 Accordingly, the 
share of total aid to investment in economic and physical infrastructure was on the increase from the early 
1970s to mid-1990s. 
The two major social sectors—education and health—had more than agriculture’s share in total 
aid throughout the period starting in the 1970s. Thus, this was not a new phenomenon that occurred only 
when the share of aid to agriculture started to decline in mid-1980s. However, the two social subsectors 
that recorded significant increases starting in the 1990s were water supply and sanitation and population 
programs. During the 1980s, the share of each was very small. Rural water and sanitation programs were 
considered helpful for the health and nutrition of the agricultural population, with indirect beneficial 
effects on agriculture. Population programs designed to reduce the rate of growth of population and 
thereby the pressure of rural population on land helped prevent or slowdown the subdivision and 
fragmentation of landholdings and thus avert a decline in productivity.  
New and Emerging Claimants on Aid 
A variety of new claimants on aid resources emerged, propelled by both domestic public support and 
international public opinion. They included humanitarian aid in response to human-made and natural 
disasters, emergency food aid, debt relief for the poorest countries trapped in heavy debt burden and 
consequent financial crises, and prevention of drug and narcotics trafficking. 
A few of these sectors had an increasing share in foreign assistance, especially during the 1990s 
and 2000s, and could be considered to be strongly competitive in making an inroad into the aggregate 
resources that were available for development assistance. There were also a few additional claimants on 
the aid resources emerged during the late 1990s and 2000s, which included general budget support, 
environment protection, and nonfood commodity assistance (Figures 3–4, 14–15, and 16–17).  
Factors Specific to the Agricultural Sector 
The factors discussed in the earlier paragraphs, which tended to reduce the share of agricultural aid, were 
external to the agricultural sector; at the same time, there were factors which were specific to agricultural 
sectors that militated against aid to agriculture. Several reviews of aid to agriculture by the donors during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, including those in the OECD/DAC Development Corporation reports of 
                                                       
13 However, the question about the extent to which aid to economic infrastructure and services, as well as to such social 
infrastructure and services as education and health (including basic health and nutrition), is devoted to rural areas cannot be 
answered in the absence of detailed data on the location of such expenditures. In view of an increasing emphasis in recent years, 
especially during the 1990s and 2000s, on the correction of “urban bias” and in favor of investment in the rural social and 
economic infrastructure, it is reasonable to assume that there has been some shift in many countries in their location toward rural 
areas.  
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1987 and later years, identified a number of reasons for the poor performance of the agricultural sector’s 
aid-financed projects. For example, the reports noted long delays in completion, or partial or total 
noncompletion; cost overruns; and large supervision costs in relation to total costs. In addition, two 
important factors considered essential for ensuring the viability of agricultural projects were frequently 
missing: provisions for (a) recovering the costs of investment projects from the users of the output or 
services, especially for irrigation projects, and (b) current expenditures for the operation and maintenance 
of the aided projects. The lack of provision for the latter was a serious handicap for the sustainability of 
projects once project aid was completed.
14
Closer examination of these shortcomings led to several conclusions. For example, agricultural 
development—no less than economic development, in general—depended on institutions and the capacity 
of human capital at the national and local level for designing and implementing programs and projects. In 
a few traditional areas of aid to agriculture, such as extension and training and research, these limitations 
emerged as very critical, especially whenever new approaches had to be introduced and evaluated before 
large-scale aid efforts could be launched.   
 These shortcomings were largely attributed to such factors as 
inadequate capacity for policy analysis, formulation, and implementation of projects, which resulted, in 
turn, from the shortage of high- and midlevel well-trained technical personnel.  
It was in this context that agriculture was incorporated in what were called, during the 1980s and 
1990s, “integrated rural development projects.” This incorporation was intended to ensure a cohesive 
framework for investment in interrelated agricultural and rural development projects. Various 
components, such as research, training, extension, irrigation, marketing, and input supply, were put 
together under one administrative authority for the purposes of financing and implementation. The 
administrative complexity of such projects, which combined the multiple functions of different ministries 
and agencies under one authority, soon became apparent, eventually leading to a reconsideration of and 
retreat from this approach. The process of experimentation, including the introduction over time of 
different approaches to the provision of aid to the diverse components of agricultural investment, did 
imply that the aid flow over time slowed or was interrupted as new approaches were designed and 
modified or abandoned.
15
It was increasingly realized that the design and effectiveness of rural institutions engaged in the 
provision of services in the agricultural sector were closely linked with a country’s totality of 
administrative structure, including procedures for recruitment of staff, promotions, salaries, and 
compensations, as well as incentive structures. Thus, agricultural development institutions could not be 
treated in isolation. In a few countries, however, the political leadership was strong and committed 
enough to make changes in the agricultural institutions as exceptions, independently of the rest of the 
government.  
 
The success of the Green Revolution in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s was based on the availability 
of high-yielding seeds, which, when combined with water and fertilizer, led to considerable increases in 
output. This revolution was a relatively simple, straightforward approach focused on increasing the 
production of one or two cereal crops—wheat and rice—mainly on large or medium farms in the most 
fertile regions with adequate water supplies, either rainfed or irrigated. State agencies played a major role 
in delivering the package of inputs without regard to the variety of social and environmental 
considerations; these considerations became important to aid policy in the 1990s and 2000s. As 
development assistance to agriculture moved away from the comparatively simple technical fix of 
resource transfers that characterized the Asian Green Revolution, the complexity of agricultural projects 
increased and the associated transaction costs for development agencies inevitably were greater, not to 
speak of the fact that the second-generation problems following the Green Revolution were yet to emerge. 
The task of spreading the benefits of Green Revolution to agroecologically unfavorable regions and to 
                                                       
14 These shortcomings were more frequently observed in Africa than in other developing regions. Since the late 1980s, the 
relative allocation of aid shifted to Africa as donors paid increasing attention to the lackluster performance of agriculture there . 
(Lipton 1987; Lipton and Paarlberg 1990; von Braun et al. 1993). 
15 For many donors under pressure to increase aid effectiveness, particularly in an era of declining aid flows, agriculture 
appeared as a risky, expensive, complex area in which to invest for apparently dubious returns.  
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different cereal crops as well as to small and marginal farmers was complex and challenging. All these 
factors posed difficult technological, sociological, and political problems that were not easy to resolve and 
that did not lend themselves to the formulation of projects at the same speed as before in order to quickly 
absorb large volumes of aid.  
This awareness among donors led them to devote an increasing proportion of aid to build up 
institutions and organizations in order to train specialized personnel for agriculture and to encourage civil 
society organizations and NGOs to supplement or provide alternatives to government institutions. 
However, all these efforts to build institutions and human capital needed to formulate and effectively 
implement agricultural projects were very time consuming and were not assured of quick success.
16
At the same time, there was the need for reforms of macro- as well as micro- and sectoral policies 
in order to provide incentives for farmers and to encourage their willingness to produce and invest. In the 
absence of these two conditions, that is, institutions and appropriate policies, returns from agricultural 
investment, both private and public, would remain low, thus discouraging both aid flow and domestic 
investment.  
  
In many countries, input and output prices, including taxation and subsidy policies, reduced 
farmers’ profits from production and investment. All these factors which adversely affected the returns 
from investment projects turned the donors’ attention to policy reforms—both sectoral and macro, 
including exchange rates or tariffs or subsidies or taxes that affected the profitability of agriculture. 
Closely related were the fluctuations in outputs and prices caused by variations in weather, pests, and 
diseases, as well as by the variability in the supply and prices of inputs. Many developing countries did 
not have insurance schemes for managing such risks, and this adversely affected the flow of credit to 
agriculture. This emphasized the need for intervention by the government for the stabilization of prices, 
which included such measures as the creation and the management of national food reserves as well as the 
management of food imports and exports.  
Attempts were made to remedy some of these shortcomings by providing new or different types 
of aid such as program or sector aid in addition to project-based aid to agriculture. These types of aid 
adopted a comprehensive approach towards the agricultural sector as a whole or to a subsector. They 
included aid for institutional reforms and for building human capacity. These types of policy-based 
lending, included provisions for wide-ranging policy reforms bearing on agricultural prices, taxes, and 
subsidies, and so on as well as on agricultural development institutions dealing with credit, marketing, 
extension, public good stock management and trade regulations—all of which affected the profitability 
and viability of the agricultural sector or a subsector.  
To illustrate, the functions that were previously performed by the state in the provision of such 
services as the  marketing of outputs and supply of inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, or credit, 
and so on or small-scale irrigation or even some types of extension or research were considered in many 
instances as part of the private sector’s responsibility. The government-to-government development 
assistance or foreign aid was not, therefore, considered appropriate for such purposes.  
It has frequently been argued that the decline in the share of agriculture in total aid, in particular 
in the 1990s, was due to the international development community’s complacency regarding food 
availability in the world. This was a period of ample supplies and low food prices in the world market. 
However, the abundance was mainly due to large increases in production in the major food-exporting 
countries, including advanced, countries, and major food-exporting developing countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil. At the same time, the two largest food-consuming countries—China and India—
increased the degree of their food self-sufficiency and reduced their import demand, thus reducing the 
pressure of demand in the world market.  
The phenomenon of low food prices during the 1980s and early caused the export interests in 
developed countries to oppose aid for increasing production and supplies in the developing world, which 
                                                       
16 It took time for the implementation of policy reforms and the results of such reforms to become visible and effective. The 
process of negotiations and agreements on policy conditionalities between donors and recipients took time, often slowing the 
flow of aid.  
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could further depress world prices. Low prices meant low returns from investments in agricultural aid 
projects, thus discouraging donor countries’ aid efforts. This was indeed a very short-term view and did 
not take into account the long-term trends in the world food supply and demand balance. For one thing, 
the increase in food production in the developing countries like India was concentrated on the supply of 
major cereals (mainly rice, wheat, and corn), accompanied by rising imports of noncereal crops, such as 
oilseeds. In most of the low-income developing countries, food production did not record a substantial 
increase. In fact, by the end of 1990s, the developing world was increasingly beset with the problems of 
water and land scarcity (in addition to a long-term decline in the growth rate in yield) acting as constraints 
on the future food supply. At the same time, there was the prospect of growing demand for food, 
including livestock products and fruits and vegetables, from an increasing population with a higher per 
capita income. Some forecasts, on the basis of this analysis, indicated an eventual rise in food prices.
17
Institutional Arrangement in Donor Agencies 
 
Another set of reasons for the declining share of agricultural aid were related to the administrative and 
bureaucratic arrangements in the donor countries for making the intersectoral allocation of aid. There was 
always a competition among the various sectoral ministries—for example, agriculture versus not only 
industry and transport, but also health, education, energy, and environmental protection. Moreover, in the 
1990s, the structure of the aid bureaucracy in the donor countries was reorganized on a regional or 
subregional basis, rather than on a sectoral basis. This meant that each group of generalists or bureaucrats 
decided the priorities of aid allocation for their own region or subregion; subject-matter specialists, who 
were few in number, did not have much influence on the intersectoral aid allocation.
18
In recent years, many aid agencies, both multilateral and bilateral, decided to downgrade their 
technical and professional staff required for formulating, designing, and overseeing agricultural projects. 
This occurred even though there was a realization, based on experience, that donor agencies required a 
considerable amount of technical expertise to perform such functions, especially since multiple and 
increasingly complex considerations had increasingly to be incorporated in the aid projects/programs 
(World Bank 2007). Many donor agencies, however, asserted that though they had reduced their technical 
staff, they had hired private consultants to provide such services. However, experience had shown that 
managing, coordinating, and ensuring the quality of work of a large number of consultants was much 
more difficult than was expected. Thus, attempts by donor agencies to economize resulted in fact in a 
delay in aid commitment and disbursement or in a deterioration of the quality of development assistance 
or both. 
 To emphasize the 
point, in some important donor countries and agencies, agriculture was subsumed as just one component 
among many such departments or sectors—for example, in the World Bank, agriculture was incorporated 
into “Sustainable Development Network,” while in the DFID in the UK, it became part of “Rural 
Livelihoods.”  
                                                       
17 The projections of rising food prices by isolated research and academic institutions in the late 1990s were not widely 
known or accepted so as to influence the conventional wisdom or make a dent in the complacency of donors or the international 
policymaking community. 
18 Recent attempts to increase overall aid to developing countries have focused at the international level on reaching a 
consensus regarding the amounts of aid flow that are considered necessary to achieve the sector and subsector targets established 
by the Millennium Development Goals and other comparable announcements of the past few years. The goal is to mobilize 
specific amounts of resources for each target, rather than leaving the decisions for allocating the sectoral aid in the hands of aid 
agencies. This new strategy is based on “multidonor pooled funding that has clear timeline, objectives, and accountability” 
(Sachs 2010). The bilateral aid programs are scattered among small efforts, rather than being focused on achieving well-
coordinated, specific, major targets. The examples of “pooled” donor funding include the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Other funds, such as aid to adapt to climate change, are also contemplated. It has been suggested that 
there should be more funds such as the Global Infrastructure Fund, Maternal and Child Health Initiative, and so on. In this way, 
once donors decide on the quantitative targets of assistance to a particular sector or purpose, the process of committing aid is 
placed in a new mechanism for pooling the resources of all the donors under one board or committee, which then approves 
projects submitted by individual countries. The disbursement of funds can be undertaken by an international or regional 
development finance institution (Sachs 2010).  
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Falling Share of Agriculture in GDP and in Total Aid 
It is plausible to hypothesize that the share of agriculture in a country’s GDP is an important criterion or 
consideration determining the allocation of aid to agriculture. In other words, over the years, the share of 
agriculture in GDP has declined so also the share of agriculture in aid may be expected to decline across 
countries and over time in individual countries. 
If data on the share of agriculture in total aid for each recipient country were available, it would 
have been possible to test this hypothesis across countries and over time. However, in the absence of such 
data, an attempt is made below to examine this relationship indirectly and in a very general way, by 
comparing the regional distribution of the total aid to agriculture with the share of agriculture in the GDP 
in the different regions of the developing world. 
The share of agriculture in the GDP of low-income countries over the years from the 1980s to the 
2000s was higher than that in the middle-income countries (Table 7).
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Table 7. Share of value added in agriculture in GDP 
 The share of Sub-Saharan Africa 
as well as South and Central Asia—which were predominantly low-income countries—in the agricultural 
aid during the period between 1990s and 2000s was much higher than that of the middle-income countries 
of the Far East, Middle East and North Africa, and South America (Table 8). It may be noted that, within 
the group of low-income countries, the share of agriculture in total aid was lower for South and Central 
Asia than for Africa during the period 1993–2006 (Table 9). At the same time, the share of agriculture in 
GDP in South Asia (excepting Nepal) was less than the average share in the low-income countries, 
dominated by Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 7). This corresponds with the hypothesis that a low share of 
agriculture in GDP was generally associated with a low share of agricultural aid. 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2002  2002–06 
Low-income countries  –  38.2  36.7  34.3  30.4  28.5 
Middle-income countries  20.3  19.1  17.2  13.7  11.0  12.9 
Middle- and low-income countries  20.8  19.8  18.0  14.5  11.8  11.5 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002, 2006. 
Table 8. Regional distribution of aid to agriculture (percentage) 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2002  2002–06 
             
Sub-Saharan Africa  25.2  30.2  40.7  41.5  37.4  37.1 
Asia and Central Asia  45.0  42.1  28.0  23.7  23.2 
40.3 
Far East  16.4  14.2  21.3  23.7  25.1 
Middle East and North Africa  9.6  4.1  5.2  7.5  3.1  6.7 
South America  3.8  9.4  4.8  3.6  11.2  15.9 
Sources: DFID 2004; Oxfam 2009. 
                                                       
19 The World Bank defines low-income countries as those with per capita income equal or less than $975 (PPP) and middle-
income countries are those with per capita income between $975 and $11305 further sub-divided into lower middle-income 
countries with per capita income between $975 and $3855 and upper middle-income countries with per capita income between 
$3856 and $11305). The low-income and middle-income countries are defined as developing countries and they are the recipients 
of Official Development Assistance. According to the classification of countries by World Bank (based on 2006 per capita 
income), South Asia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan are low-income countries and Sri Lanka and 
Maldives are middle-income countries (lower middle-income countries), whereas in Central Asia, out of six countries, three are 
low income and three are lower middle-income countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, out of forty-seven countries, thirty-seven are 
low-income and sixteen are lower middle-income countries (World Bank 2007 and 2010, WDR).  
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Table 9. Share of agriculture in GDP 
  1985  1993  2001  2006 
Sri Lanka  27.7  24.6  20.1  13.4 
India  31.2  20.6  14.6  12.5 
Pakistan  28.5  25.1  24.1  20.4 
Bangladesh  33.0  26.3  24.0  19.0 
Nepal  52.0  44.9  39.4  33.7 
Range of inter-country variation  (28–52)  (21–45)  (15–40)  (13.4–34) 
Source: World Bank, ibid. 
However, the difference in respect of share of agriculture in GDP between the South Asian 
countries (excepting Nepal), on the one hand, and the rest of the low-income countries (mainly Africa), 
on the other, was much less during 1980s than during 1990s. There was no information on share of 
agriculture GDP in the Central Asian countries as distinguished from South Asia. The share of agriculture 
in aid was higher for Asia and Central Asia than for Africa in this period.
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The share of agriculture in GDP has declined over the years in both the groups of developing 
countries, that is, by 27 percent in low-income countries and by 30 percent in middle-income countries 
between 1985 and 2002–06 (Table 7). But the rate of decline in South Asia was faster than that in the rest 
of the low-income countries, ranging from 60 percent in India and 50 percent in Sri Lanka, to 35 percent 
in Nepal, 33 percent in Bangladesh, and 28 percent in Pakistan between 1985 and 2006. Correspondingly, 
the share of South and Central Asia in agricultural aid steeply declined from 45 percent in 1980s and 42 
percent in 1985 to 23.2 percent in 2002. However, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa in agricultural aid, on 
the other hand, increased from 30.2 percent to 37.1 percent (by 23 percent) during this period. 
 
It is only to be expected that share of agriculture in GDP is not the only or even the most 
important consideration for the inter-country allocation of aid to agriculture. It appears, however, that on 
the basis of very highly aggregative data, there is some indirect evidence that the share of agriculture is 
possibly a consideration in the allocation of aid. It is also to be expected that the public expenditures by 
the developing countries on agriculture decline with a decline in the share of agriculture in the GDP and 
investment priorities change in favor of the nonagricultural sector for achieving both income growth and 
poverty alleviation. Hence, the demand for aid to agriculture on their part may also diminish. However, 
the regional allocation of aid is the outcome of the country-level negotiations between donors and 
recipients. In this sense, large countries such as in South Asia may suffer from a disadvantage in 
comparison with small countries, even if economic characteristics and eligibility criteria for aid are the 
same for both sets of countries.
21
                                                       
20 The provision of aid is decided by a multiplicity of considerations, both economic and non-economic. It must be noted 
that this regional share of aid is the outcome of discussions taken at the level of individual recipient country by the donor 
agencies and therefore is a weak indicator of the inter-country allocation of aid.  
 Because of multiplicity of considerations, there is often a minimum 
level of aid, especially bilateral aid, below which the amount of aid to an individual recipient country is 
not reduced—even in a period of general stagnation in the overall aid flow. With an increasing emphasis 
on poverty alleviation as an objective of foreign aid, the absolute number of the rural poor as well as the 
intensity of poverty, that is, percentage of the rural population below the poverty line has emerged as a 
criterion for the inter-country allocation of aid. At the same time in many developing countries, the rural 
poor was mostly engaged in agriculture. The high intensity of poverty in Africa was a dominant 
consideration for increasing aid (including agricultural aid) to Africa starting 1990s. 
21 Foreign aid is governed by multiple considerations, not only those of international economic cooperation/interdependence, 
including trade, investment, and technology transfer, and so on but also political and strategic nature. This paper does not deal 
with the subject of military assistance. It has certainly various economic consequences. It is after all an addition to the pool of 
external resources flowing to the recipient countries and financial resources in the ultimate analysis are fungible between 
different users and sectors. It absorbs large resources but it is a vast subject which could not be treated here. Moreover, the 
statistics on military aid that is available in the public domain is very limited.   
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The 2008 World Development Report on agriculture classified the developing countries into three 
categories: agriculture-based economies (agriculture’s share in GDP at around 30 percent), transforming 
economies (share of agriculture in GDP around 19 percent), and urbanized economies (share of 
agriculture in GDP around 7 percent). This classification is intended as a guide to indicate the mainspring 
for growth in developing countries. In transforming and urbanized economies, the nonfarm sector—that 
is, the rural nonfarm sector in the former and the urban nonfarm sector (industry and services) in the 
latter—is considered the dominant source of growth. Only in the first group of countries of agriculture-
based economies (mainly in African countries) should there be a focus on agriculture as the primary 
engine of growth. Accordingly, in the group of transforming countries, which included the South Asian 
countries, relative emphasis should be placed on the promotion of the rural nonfarm sector to generate a 
larger proportion of rural income and employment. However, in a few of these countries, there are close 
linkages between the farm and nonfarm sectors in respect of intersectoral demand, including the flow of 
intermediate inputs. Hence, their investment priorities may need to take into account the indirect growth-
stimulating role of the agricultural sector on rural income.   
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6.  BROADER MEASURES OF AID TO AGRICULTURE 
The agricultural sector is increasingly being incorporated in the wider concept of food security and 
therefore aid to agriculture is considered in the framework of investment programs and policies needed to 
achieve food security. For example, the investment proposals following the various G8, G20, and other 
international donor conferences in the aftermath of the 2007 world food crisis included elements that were 
outside the agricultural sector as defined earlier and in the traditional analysis by OECD, FAO, and other 
related food and agricultural institutions.  
How and to what extent investment in agriculture is now considered in the context of investments 
in the interrelated sectors is exemplified by the statement of the G8 Expert Group on Global Food 
Security, following the post-2007 food crisis. This statement on food security includes commitment to 
adopt mid- to long-term measures to stimulate food production and increase investment in agriculture. 
The components of this commitments are to (1) explore options of a coordinated approach on stock 
management, including the pros and cons of building a “virtual” intentionally coordinated reserve system 
for humanitarian purposes; (2) reverse the decline in aid and investment in the agricultural sector; (3) 
promote agricultural research and development and the training of a new generation of developing-
country scientists and experts; (4) support infrastructure improvements, including irrigation, 
transportation, rural roads and markets, supply chain, storage and distribution systems, and quality 
control; (5) assist in developing a food security early warning system through the improvement of 
national statistical systems and so forth; (6) encourage the efforts of international financial institutions in 
replenishing funds; (7) support country-level development strategies in adapting to climate change, 
combating desertification, and promoting conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, while 
intensifying efforts to address climate change; (8) ensure the compatibility of policies for the sustainable 
production and use of biofuels with food security and accelerate development and commercialization of 
sustainable second-generation biofuels from nonfood plant materials and inedible biomass; (9) promote 
food governance in developing countries, with particular emphasis on their food security and market 
policies; and (10) mainstream the food security objectives in the development policies of donors and 
recipients countries. The following elements and components in the commitments are far outside the 
confines of the conventional definition of aid to agriculture: (1) international reserve stock management; 
(2) roads and transport; (3) adaptation to climate change; (4) combating desertification; (5) conservation 
of biological diversity; (6) sustainable production and use of biofuels, including second-generation 
biofuels; and (7) promotion of good governance, which includes such items as investment in legal 
systems development, human resource development, and economic and social infrastructure. 
The Global Agricultural and Food Security Program, administered by the World Bank with 
financial contributions from other donors (multilateral and bilateral), lays the groundwork of the 
investment program based on the above-mentioned G8 commitment. The program’s objective is stated to 
scale up support to help poor countries to (a) alleviate poverty, (b) improve rural livelihoods, and (c) 
improve food security.
22
1.  raising agricultural productivity; 
 The five components of the program are as follows: 
2.  linking farmers to markets, including upgrading and improving management of rural 
infrastructure;   
3.  reducing risk and vulnerability, which includes, among other things, strengthening food-
related social protection (transfer programs, insurance schemes, and institutional capacity 
                                                       
22 The USAID administrator’s announcement about the designation of 20 focus countries in fulfillment of the U.S. initiative 
stressed that “Feed the Future targets the causes of poverty, hunger, and undernutrition.” These 20 focus countries “demonstrate 
potential for rapid and sustainable agriculture-led growth, good governance, and opportunities for regional cooperation through 
trade and other mechanism,” signifying “U.S. commitment to scale up nutritional interventions . . . Feed the Future will build 
upon strong existing foundations to make improvements in global health, poverty reduction, and the overall development.” 
Addressing undernutrition is key to both the President’s Global Health Initiative (GHI) and Feed the Future (USAID 2010).   
33 
strengthening); improving nutrition of vulnerable groups (women empowerment program) 
and providing essential vitamins and minerals; 
4.  improving nonfarm rural livelihoods by improving the rural investment climate, expanding 
the rural infrastructure, and promoting nonfarm rural entrepreneurship; and 
5.  providing technical assistance, institutional building, and capacity development (World Bank 
2009). 
The report of the UK Parliamentary Committee on the United Kingdom’s Aid Programme for 
food security and hunger emphasizes the following: 
1.  investment in population growth control; 
2.  adaptation and mitigation efforts to deal with the fallout effects of climate change on 
agriculture; 
3.  economizing the use of energy and water in view of the projected limitation on their supplies 
and on the limited prospects of an increased supply of essential fertilizers, such as phosphate; 
4.  universal access to pure drinking water; 
5.  agriculture that focuses on research, extension, and education based on high-quality, trained 
personnel (the current emphasis on primary education neglects the importance of trained 
personnel in the various sectors and aspects of agriculture); 
6.  addressing health issues (HIV/AIDS in Africa results in a loss of farmworkers as well as of 
high-level personnel); and 
7.  strengthening the role of women in agriculture, including orienting extension and research 
services toward women farmers (Birch et al. 2010). 
This list clearly illustrates the much broader approach toward the role of investment in agriculture 
than had been the case in the international development community.
23
Recently, the OECD/DAC, possibly in recognition of the wider aspects of food security, added a 
few supplementary items to its original definition of agriculture. The new category, called Food Security–
Related Subsectors, includes rural development, development food aid, and emergency food aid.
 The ongoing measurements of aid 
to and domestic investment in agriculture do not encompass these newer, additional investments, which 
affect, assist, and complement the food and agriculture sector. Therefore, in light of the above, the 
currently conventional framework used by international and UN agencies, such as OECD, FAO, the 
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for measuring and monitoring both external and 
internal investment in agriculture in developing countries may have to redesigned to include items and 
components so far ignored so as to define investment in agriculture in the wider context of food security, 
if it is to be relevant and useful. 
24
                                                       
23 The OECD’s definition of agriculture, which is widely quoted and used as the basis of analysis, debate, and discussion by 
national and international policy analysts and policymakers, does not refer to many items covered in the above G8 statement or 
World Bank’s Global Agricultural and Food Security Programme such as the majority of the items in the UK program, such as 
population growth, climate change (adaptation and mitigation effects), access to drinking water, and health (including 
HIV/AIDS), are not included in agriculture as currently defined. All the above approaches emphasize how quite a few 
components of social infrastructure and services, as defined in the OECD and other sectoral classifications of aid, are included in 
the agriculture and food security program. 
 A 
recent paper by the OECD secretariat provides an estimate for these three food security–related 
subsectors. For the average of two years (2006–2007), the annual volume of aid in constant 2007 prices 
for these three subitems was about $5.8 billion, which was not much below the amount of aid for 
agriculture alone, which was $6.2 billion (OECD 2008, 2010) (Table 10). If all four components of aid 
24 The readily accessible OECD database does not provide the breakdown into these sub-items; these data can only be 
accessed by scrutinizing the detailed itemized descriptions of aid from each individual donor country and institution, as provided 
in the original submission by donors to the CRS database. Accordingly, there is no easy way to test the share of these additional 
components of agriculture and food security in the total aid flow. Development food aid is alternatively called Food Aid/Food 
Security.  
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for food security were considered together, the amount would almost double the amount of agriculture 
alone (Table 11). 
It is interesting to observe that until 1999, FAO distinguished between two estimates of aid to 
agriculture in its publications—narrow and broad. The broad estimates included not only what was 
conventionally included in agriculture (land and water, research, training and extension, inputs, 
agricultural services, crop production, livestock, fisheries, forestry, and livestock) but also the following 
items: agroindustries, manufacture of inputs, rural development and infrastructure, and regional and river 
development. These additional items make up about 68 percent of the amount meant for agriculture as 
narrowly defined in 1998 (FAO 2001). The “broad” definition also includes some items that are included 
in the OECD’s “Industry” classification. In addition, rural development, which is included in the OECD’s 
“Food Security–Related Subsectors,” is also a component of the FAO’s broad definition of agriculture. 
In 2008, aid to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries was $7.8 billion (in current prices). The G8 and 
other partners agreed to mobilize $22 billion for three years to promote agricultural development and food 
security (L’Aquila Declaration). This works out at about $7 billion a year; the current flow of aid to 
agriculture in 2008 (as conventionally defined by OECD) is slightly above what is postulated in the 
commitment. On the other hand, if the G8 commitment of $7 billion a year is meant to be in addition to 
the existing flow of aid, the newly required amount of aid flow would be $14.8 billion instead of $7.8.
25
                                                       
25 The annual amount of $5.8 billion recently provided as aid for three food security purposes was less than the $7.0 billion 
(by about $1.2 billion) that the G8 committed to as additional annual aid for agriculture and food security over the next three 
years (World Bank, ibid.). Thus, if the World Bank definition of the G8 commitment is accepted, then the current flow of aid to 
Food Security–Related Sectors, as defined by the OECD, is close to the amount of aid proposed as additional aid by the G8. 
Thus, it seems that no increase is necessary to meet the G8 commitment of aid for agriculture and food security. 
 
This target can be achieved by increasing the total aid to all sectors by about $7.8 billion so that the 
amount of total aid would have to be about $159 billion as against $151 billion in 2008. However, a 
doubling of the aid to agriculture (as conventionally defined by OECD), keeping constant the absolute 
amount of aid to the rest of the economy, would involve a decline in the share of the rest of the economy 
in overall aid. If, on the other hand, the share of the rest of the economy were to remain unchanged, then 
the amount of aggregate aid must increase even further.  
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Table 10. Aid to agriculture- and food security-related sectors 
  Annual average commitments in million$ (in constant price of 2007) 
  2002-03  2003-04  2004-05  2005-06  2006-07  2007-08 
  Amount  Ratio  Amount  Ratio  Amount  Ratio  Amount  Ratio  Amount  Ratio  Amount  Ratio 
                         
(1) Agriculture and forestry  4,614  40.1  5,061  49.7  5,054  45,7  5,349  49.4  6,168  51.8  7,234  58.9 
                         
(2) Rural development  1,697  14.7  875  8.6  1,254  11.4  945  8.7  1,473  12.4  1,000  8.1 
                         
(3) Development food aid  3,045  26.6  2,181  21.4  2,388  21.6  2,212  20.4  2,073  17.4  1,597  13.0 
                         
(4) Emergency food aid  2,154  18.7  2,076  20.4  2,337  21.2  2,311  21.4  2,204  18.5  2,441  19.9 
                         
TOTAL  11,510  100.0  10,193  100.0  11,033  100.0  10,817  100.0  11,918  100.0  12,272  100.0 
                         
Combined total amounts of 
items 2, 3 & 4 as a percentage of 
item 1 
 
149.46    101.40    118.30    102.22    93.22    69.64 
Source: OECD/DAC 2009, 2010. 
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Commitments for agriculture (narrow 
definition1) 
12.3  14.1  14.8  13.5  11.1  10.0  10.6  8.6  10.3  7.2  9.3  9.3  8.3  7.2 
                             
Commitments for agriculture (other 
components) 
6.0  5.4  4.4  4.1  3.8  3.6  3.1  2.9  3.0  4.3  2.9  4.4  5.6  5.0 
                             
Total commitments for agriculture (broad 
definition2) 
18.3  19.5  19.2  17.6  14.9  13.6  13.7  11.5  13.3  11.5  12.2  13.7  14.0  12.3 
                             
Commitments for other components as a 
percentage of narrow definition of agriculture  48.8  38.3  29.7  30.4  34.7  36.4  29.3  34.1  29.3  59.0  30.7  46.9  67.7  67.7 
Source: FAO 1999, 2001. 
1 Narrow definition includes the following sectors: Land and water; research, training and extension; inputs; agricultural services; crop production; livestock; fisheries; forestry; other 
agriculture. 
2 Broad definition includes all the above plus manufacturing of inputs; environment protection, agroindustries; rural development/infrastructure; regional and river development.  
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
The statistics of official development assistance, both total aid and its sectoral distribution as currently 
provided by OECD/DAC/CRS can be considered “work in progress” as illustrated by a few examples 
below. There is a room for improvement and expansion in the current statistics on aid to agriculture. This 
is partly related to the sectoral classification of total aid in respect of the coverage, content, and the 
definition of various sectors. For one thing, a certain proportion of total aid, ranging from 23 to 36 percent 
in different years, is not allocable between different sectors and hence it is not known how much of this 
relates to agriculture. How to resolve this problem needs some thought. One way of presenting the 
sectoral distribution of aid data would be to classify the data into various sectors after excluding the 
“unallocable sectors” from the amount of total aid. 
Secondly, there are three sectors in the classification of total aid, that is, administrative costs of 
donors, expenditure on refugees in donor countries and support to NGO, presumably the developed 
countries NGOs, which do not in fact constitute a transfer of resources to the recipient countries. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that they should not be included in the measurement of the flow of aid to 
developing countries. 
In order to obtain a better understanding and measurement of the aid flow to agriculture, it is 
necessary to examine how much of the investment in the related sectors such as economic and social 
infrastructure is undertaken in the rural areas, meaning rural roads, storage and transport, rural 
electrification, rural health and sanitation facilities, and so on This information is not currently available. 
Similar is the case with aid to agro-industry, including the processing of agricultural outputs and the 
production of agricultural inputs (fertilizers and agricultural equipment, and so on). These activities are 
essential ingredients for agricultural production. 
The sector of rural development which is, however, not included in the agricultural sector as 
defined by OECD/DAC/CRS but is presented as a separate sector/subsector, does not include any of the 
above activities; it provides information on a wide variety of disparate items ranging from national 
reserve management, land management, land use planning, land settlement and resettlement activities to 
regional development planning, geographical information system, and a few very ambiguous items as 
functional integration of rural and urban areas. 
While the composition of OECD/DAC/CRS aid statistics is admittedly based on the data supplied 
by the donors, both bilateral and multilateral, the statistics of aid to agriculture that is frequently used by 
bilateral donors and some international financial institutions, does not always conform with and often 
includes items not included in the OECD/DAC/CRS definition of aid to agriculture. This may partly be 
due to the widening of the definition of aid to agriculture in recent years to include diverse components of 
agriculture and food security which extend beyond the production and availability of food to the stability 
of and universal access to food supplies linked to the increase in the “entitlements” or income of the poor. 
At the same time there is a tendency on the part of some donors to pick and choose items from this wider 
net for the measurement of their own aid to agriculture. Thus, there is a need for the OECD/DAC as well 
as the non-OECD donor agencies to indicate the differences in their respective definitions of aid to 
agriculture and food security in order to facilitate the comparability and consistency of measurement of 
aid.  
To go one step further, one may suggest that it is desirable that the international development 
community, including all the donors—bilateral and multilateral—as well as the UN agencies, agree on 
what is to be included in the definition of agriculture and food security and to use it consistently in their 
measurement and analysis of aid. This would also help improve the analysis of the impact or the success 
of aid in achieving its objectives, including the promotion of agriculture and food security in the recipient 
countries. 
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There is yet another aspect of the sectoral classification of total aid as recorded by the individual 
donors or by OECD/DAC/CRS in their aid statistics. The aid statistics including their sectoral 
classification as recorded by the recipient countries frequently does not conform with the donors’ or 
OECD/DAC/CRS definitions. To make matters more complex, the sectoral classification of public 
expenditures in the developing countries does not conform with the sectoral classification of aid by the 
OECD/DAC/CRS or the individual donors. The aid flow in the recipient countries is incorporated in their 
public expenditure accounts and, therefore, their sectoral classification follows that of their public 
expenditures.  
The sectoral classification of public expenditures in the member countries is recorded by the IMF 
in its International Financial Statistics. Firstly, this is different from the sectoral classification of aid that 
is used by the OECD/DAC/CRS and/or by the different donor agencies. Secondly, it differs from the way 
in which the individual countries classify their own public expenditure accounts. Moreover, the sectoral 
classification of public expenditures varies as between the different countries. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to analyze on a comparable basis the role of aid in financing the public expenditures in the 
different sectors of individual countries.  
It is apparent from the above that it is important that efforts are made to improve the consistency 
and comparability of economic/sectoral classifications of public expenditures as well as of aid in 
developing countries. After all this should be ideally a matter for concern or attention on the part of both 
the bilateral and multilateral donors as well as the recipient countries. For example, if a donor agency 
wishes to undertake an analysis of the impact of its aid in the different sectors of a recipient country, it is 
necessary to have a consistent and comparable sectoral classification of statistics on aid as well as on 
public expenditures. 
Occasionally, the donor agencies undertake the evaluation of the effectiveness of aid as well as of 
public expenditures in a particular sector such as agriculture or some subsector of agriculture such as 
irrigation or credit or agricultural extension and training. That is the only occasion that a rigorous and a 
comparable classification of the components of public expenditures and aid the sector or the subsector is 
undertaken. But then this analysis is done most often in respect of aid from a particular donor agency 
interested in the evaluation of its own assistance. It does not include the aid from other donors. In fact, 
most frequently the analysis of aid effectiveness is confined to an individual project and not its overall 
assistance to a recipient country. 
While the desired improvement, as outlined above, in the quality, content, and classification of 
aid statistics, including in particular the aid to agriculture and food security, is undertaken, a few 
conclusions on the flow of aid to agriculture and its implications can be drawn on the basis of the 
currently available information. 
Starting in the late 1980s, the absolute amount of aid to agriculture in real terms declined over the 
years, as did the share of agricultural in the total aid. The decline in agricultural aid may be considered in 
the context of the trend in the total aid flow. The total aid, having increased from 1973–1975 to the end of 
the 1980s, declined until the early 2000s, when it again started to increase in 2007. All this took place in 
the context of an increasing number of recipient countries, as well as a rising number of purposes and 
objectives for which aid is provided. In a sense, the 1990s was a “lost decade” for overall development 
assistance—this was also the period when the developing countries were undertaking major structural 
reforms and were enhancing their capacity to allocate and use aid resources more efficiently.  
There were multiple reasons for the decline in the share of aid to agriculture in total aid from the 
mid-1980s to early 2000s. It is difficult to assign relative weights or importance to different reasons. How 
does one judge the appropriate size of total aid for agriculture to be provided globally by all donors to all 
recipient countries taken together? And, given the size of the total aid to be provided by all the donors, 
what should be the share of aid to agriculture? These are difficult questions to answer. 
In the post-2007 world food crisis period, donors have committed themselves to quantitative 
targets for increased aid to agriculture and food security. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
one assumes that this was done on the basis of ad hoc judgments about what was feasible on the part of 
donors and some general idea about the requirements of aid in the developing world. However, several  
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attempts were made by research institutions and individual scholars, as well as by international agencies 
such as the FAO (for example, during the 1996 World Food Summit, as well as in the aftermath of the 
2007 food crisis), to estimate total investments in the agriculture in developing countries that were 
required to achieve the desired rates of growth in agricultural production and income.
26
In the ultimate analysis, the commitment of aid flow to agriculture is decided at the country level 
by a process of interaction between donors and recipient countries.
 In addition, 
estimates were made for the domestic resources that could or need to be mobilized by developing 
countries to meet their investment requirements. Further refinements were be made to estimate the 
required public-sector investment in agriculture and the resources that could be mobilized by the public 
sector from domestic sources. The gap between the two was assumed to be filled by external aid, which 
was to be provided to the developing countries on a government-to-government basis. These estimates 
were as good as the assumptions made about many parameters involved in such estimates. Moreover, the 
underlying data for making these estimates were inadequate—in some cases woefully so; therefore, the 
estimates were likely to have very wide margins of error. 
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However, donors have an overall framework of reference for their global development assistance 
program and priorities that serves as a guide to their country-level aid programs and priorities. In recent 
years, this framework has been provided by the consensus reached by the international development 
community (as discussed earlier) regarding the objectives and sectoral priorities of aid. At the same time, 
the recipient countries have also been part of the process through which the deliberations among the 
members of the international development community, including think tanks and experts, have evolved 
towards a broad consensus regarding investment priorities. In addition, each donor country has a variety 
of interest groups that influence the country’s aid programs, depending on their relative success in 
canvassing and lobbying for their particular sectors, interests, or causes. These interest groups range from 
political parties to various civil society groups and “think tanks.” At the bureaucratic level, various 
ministers and bureaucrats in the donor country have their particular causes and programs to sponsor in the 
course of their decisionmaking process.
 The commitment of aid at the global 
level is a sum of aid committed by each donor to each recipient. It is frequently suggested that decline in 
the amount of aid to agriculture or its share in total aid is in fact a reflection of the lower priority attached 
to agriculture by the recipient countries to which the donors have merely responded. It is too simplistic to 
assume such a passive role on the part of donors. 
28
Given this general framework, the preferences of different donors in each country vary. This is 
true even though there have been attempts at coordination among donors not only internationally but also 
at the country level—not always with significant success. This coordination has also involved joint 
discussions and deliberations among and between donors and government representatives regarding their 
mutual concerns and priorities. The donor’s offer of aid in response to the recipient country’s  
  
   
                                                       
26 These estimates are based on capital and current expenditures on the generation and dissemination of technology, supply 
of inputs, irrigation, land improvement, marketing and distribution networks, and so on required for attaining the target rates of 
growth in agricultural production. A number of estimates also include investments required to increase the output of sectors 
covered in the broad definition of agriculture described earlier. However, none of the estimates include investments in the food 
security-related sectors. 
27 In some instances, an individual donor agency, bilateral or multilateral, makes tentative estimates of the amount of aid, it 
expects to provide to a recipient country in the next year or a couples of years. The estimates are made on the basis of 
assumptions regarding a recipient country’s requirements and the donor’s available resources. The amount of aid that is 
eventually committed depends on the subsequent discussions and negotiations between a donor agency and a recipient country. 
28 In a recent exercise by the DFID (UK) to determine the priorities of aid programs in light of the current economic 
recession necessitated by budget cuts, a number of considerations were taken into account when classifying their aid programs: 
(a) those with strong public backing, for which any cut would will be resisted; (b) those with strong interest of other government 
departments; (c) ministerial priorities and initiatives; and (d) priorities of the UK’s partners and stakeholders in the international 
aid community, such as countries like the United States or private philanthropic foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. A detailed list of the different types of considerations that were tentatively taken into account as a basis for final 
decisionmaking is given in Appendix Table A.4.   
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requirements or requests for assistance is discussed in course of these deliberations. Whatever is the 
forum or platform for discussions and deliberations, the final outcome is the result of negotiations and 
discussions between donors and a recipient country. In this negotiation process, it is only to be expected 
that donors have an edge. In many low-income recipient countries, the domestic institutions and human 
capacity efficient and adequate enough to formulate investment programs and aid priorities and to 
negotiate is limited.  
In most countries, whatever data are available seem to confirm, that disbursements often fall short 
of commitments and in some years by a significant commitment. Frequently, only a percentage of the 
“pipeline” of already committed and accumulated aid is disbursed every year. The amount so disbursed 
depends on the capacity of absorption or utilization of aid in the recipient country. The gap between 
commitment and disbursement, on the one hand, and disbursement and actual implementation of aided 
projects and programs, on the other, determines not only the pace of aid commitment but also the amount 
of aid that is committed. Moreover, the speed with which aid is committed, however, depends in part on 
the institutional procedures and processes in the donor agencies; however, it also depends to a large extent 
on the administrative rules and procedures for award of contracts, procurements, and budgetary 
expenditures in the recipient countries. The process of commitment as well as of disbursement of aid is 
thus time consuming, especially for the administratively weak recipient governments.  
Many of the questions raised above can only be answered by a more detailed investigation of the 
decisionmaking process by both donors and recipients at the country level about the size and composition 
of foreign aid. There is an ongoing debate as to the role of the donors’ regulations and conditions about 
the disbursement of aid, on the one hand, and, on the other, the capacity of the recipient governments to 
disburse and implement aided projects and programs. A large pipeline of undisbursed or unutilized aid 
discourages and delays or reduces the commitment of new aid. There is an incentive on the part of the 
donor agencies to shift aid to countries able to disburse and implement aid programs at a faster rate. 
However, on the other hand, this consideration is set against the increasing emphasis by the international 
donor community for attaching high priority in aid allocation to the countries with low capita income or 
countries with a large absolute number of the poor or very high intensity of poverty. At the same time, 
these are the very countries which are more likely than others to have limited institutional and human 
capacity for aid disbursement and implementation, especially when development projects seeking aid are 
required to incorporate diverse elements such as environmental protection, participation of beneficiaries, 
especially of women, favorable impact on the poor, including the marginalized populations and regions, 
and so on 
The above-mentioned considerations are especially relevant in the field of agricultural 
investment. For example, in such areas as research, extension, training and education, the capacity to 
rapidly absorb a large amount of aid is limited by the lack of appropriate institutions and human capital. It 
is difficult to increase the supply of research and extension personnel at a fast rate. A significant time gap 
is involved in training and then in allowing them to gain experience. It is now widely recognized that the 
planning, programming, and implementation of projects widely spread out throughout the rural areas of a 
country—such as extension, training, and irrigation (for example, the construction, maintenance, and 
water allocation of irrigation projects as well as supervision of extension personnel)—not to mention the 
variety of economic infrastructures—all requires a decentralized local government and a system of 
appropriate incentives.  
It is a difficult and challenging task to build-up a system of effective, local governments, because 
they involve political, sociological, and cultural aspects peculiar to the rural societies of each country. 
These problems are not amenable to easy solutions.
29
                                                       
29 The similar problems as above are likely to be felt in the social sectors projects, such as health and education, as they are 
implemented to an increasing extent in the rural areas. The problems of formulation and implementation of development projects 
in large scale, urban-oriented physical infrastructure sector such as highways, bridges, ports, airports, railings, and so on are less 
intractable. It is less difficult to monitor and supervise the implementation of such projects. In other words, the problems of 
governance are less severe. 
 This is why the donors are increasingly providing 
assistance to build institutions and human capacity in the recipient governments at both national and sub- 
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national levels so that the latter can design, experiment, and select projects and programs to suit the local 
circumstances. 
To conclude, the task of measuring, analyzing, and evaluating aid to agriculture in all its 
components, ramifications and implications remains a challenging task for researchers, policy analysts, 
and policymakers. Moreover, in order to analyze and evaluate the role of aid in promoting agricultural 
development and food security, it is necessary to examine foreign aid not only in the context of relevant 
public expenditures on these sectors as well as in a broader framework of overall development strategy.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1. Percentage distribution of total OEDC/DAC-defined agricultural aid (2005–2008) 








         
Agricultural policy and administrative 
management 
29%  15%  17%  5% 
Agricultural development  12%  11%  16%  14% 
Agricultural land resources  3%  3%  3%  –47% 
Agricultural water resources  9%  36%  27%  34% 
Agricultural inputs  2%  1%  3%  –39% 
Food crop production  10%  3%  4%  40% 
Industrial crops/export crops  4%  1%  1%  188% 
Livestock  3%  3%  2%  11% 
Agrarian reform  1%  0%  6%  169% 
Agricultural alternative development  0%  14%  0%  720% 
Agricultural extension  8%  7%  5%  141% 
Agricultural education/training  2%  0%  1%  49% 
Agricultural research  7%  1%  10%  130% 
Agricultural services  5%  3%  1%  67% 
Plant/post-harvest protection and pest control  1%  0%  0%  –35% 
Agricultural financial services  2%  2%  1%  –45% 
Agricultural cooperatives  1%  0%  0%  22% 
Livestock/veterinary services  1%  0%  2%  87% 
Source: Coppard 2009. 
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Table A.2. Sectoral distribution of total aid (in current US$ millions) 
  1995-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
           
I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  26,748  45,205  61,446  113,737  168,013 
I.1. Education  5,545  10,966  13,241  23,882  32,822 
I.2. Health  4,365  7,242  8,653  15,648  23,854 
I.3. Population Pol./Program & 
Reproductive Health  1,783  3,653  5,844  12,462  25,525 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation  7,349  9,021  9,257  14,413  20,669 
I.5. Government & Civil Society  5,541  8,724  14,762  33,713  48,336 
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services  2,165  5,599  9,689  13,620  16,807 
           
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  27,148  33,852  32,099  44,276  64,917 
II.1. Transport & Storage  12,586  17,437  15,054  18,458  29,667 
II.2. Communications  1,404  1,269  1,167  1,851  1,488 
II.3. Energy  10,377  10,257  8,534  15,062  19,539 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services  1,236  1,990  3,478  4,669  7,973 
II.5. Business & Other Services  1,545  2,898  3,865  4,236  6,250 
           
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS  11,994  15,534  15,706  22,424  29,453 
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  9,598  11,398  10,430  13,284  19,535 
III.1.a. Agriculture  7,790  9,388  8,452  11,012  16,723 
III.1.b. Forestry  1,055  1,245  1,214  1,544  1,845 
III.1.c. Fishing  752  764  764  728  968 
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction  2,100  3,502  3,862  6,832  6,049 
III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations  172  462  1,312  1,999  3,274 
III.3.b. Tourism  123  172  102  308  594 
           
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING  8,952  13,554  13,957  19,594  28,094 
IV.1. General Environment Protection  3,600  3,716  4,128  4,800  8,132 
IV.2. Other Multisector  5,352  9,837  9,830  14,794  19,962 
           
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE  
(I + II + III + IV)  74,843  108,145  123,208  200,030  290,477 
           
VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL 
PROGRAM ASSISTANCE  9,185  12,744  14,292  15,883  21,648 
IV.1. General Budget Support  6,463  7,518  8,080  10,808  15,595 
IV.2. Development Food Aid/Food 
Security Assistance  1,613  3,956  5,588  4,396  4,493 
IV.3. Other Commodity Assistance  1,109  1,270  623  680  1,561 
           
VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  5,873  9,528  14,516  51,174  42,003 
           
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID  4,776  12,022  10,772  24,810  27,519 
VIII.1. Emergency Response  4,297  11,188  9,568  20,127  23,524 
VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & 
Rehabilitation  480  834  1,205  4,658  3,314 
VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & 
Preparedness  –  –  –  24  680 
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Table A.2. Continued 
  1995-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
           
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF 
DONORS  145  1,268  4,123  7,546  15,594 
           
X. SUPPORT TO NGO’S  609  949  4,189  2,383  5,286 
           
XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR COUNTRIES  443  581  2,064  4,684  6,298 
           
XII. UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED  1,622  3,734  3,170  4,202  4,484 
           
TOTAL  
(V + VI + VII + VIII + IX + X + XI + XII)  97,496  148,972  176,335  310,711  413,309 





Table A.3. Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid (in current US$ millions) 
  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84  1985-87  1988-90  1991-93  1994-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
                           
I. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  5,481  7,059  9,396  16,559  18,771  23,456  33,870  36,346  45,156  39,701  45,362  79,669  116,691 
I.1. Education  4,031  3,690  4,978  8,651  8,512  9,912  14,458  14,439  16,693  14,214  11,679  18,022  25,821 
I.2. Health  124  1,258  2,138  3,707  3,770  4,172  4,903  4,697  6,286  5,235  5,846  9,645  13,813 
I.3. Population Pol. / Program & 
Reproductive Health  –  –  –  –  55  826  1,490  1,343  2,121  2,184  3,911  7,493  17,305 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation  372  626  658  1,278  2,091  3,043  5,219  6,722  8,907  7,171  6,178  9,964  14,189 
I.5. Government & Civil Society  273  675  488  910  1,501  2,430  3,419  4,405  4,714  5,074  9,191  24,716  33,624 
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services  681  810  1,134  2,013  2,843  3,073  4,382  4,739  6,436  5,822  8,558  9,829  11,939 
                           
II. ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
SERVICES  1,792  3,795  6,893  12,099  13,811  17,660  26,466  29,813  35,198  25,994  20,164  29,697  42,949 
II.1. Transport & Storage  799  1,145  2,226  5,754  5,086  6,621  10,646  12,000  16,202  11,693  10,473  10,719  17,531 
II.2. Communications  312  1,083  693  1,274  2,200  2,274  4,417  3,851  2,506  1,405  883  1,601  1,073 
II.3. Energy  681  1,459  3,552  4,991  6,115  7,166  8,773  11,602  12,884  8,934  5,178  12,278  13,356 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services  –  –  –  –  317  983  467  1,273  1,097  971  1,166  2,468  6,528 
II.5. Business & Other Services  –  108  422  80  92  617  2,163  1,086  2,509  2,989  2,463  2,631  4,461 
                           
III. PRODUCTION SECTORS  1,901  7,018  10,211  17,982  16,156  17,138  21,859  20,050  17,503  12,251  10,234  13,600  18,068 
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  801  2,539  4,588  8,399  8,253  11,058  13,270  11,925  12,487  8,994  7,463  7,997  12,137 
III.1.a. Agriculture  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  5,497  6,544  5,663  6,107  9,917 
III.1.b. Forestry  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  700  966  874  1,333  1,480 
III.1.c. Fishing  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  456  552  603  557  739 
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction  1,100  2,212  2,601  4,112  3,875  5,237  6,835  6,352  2,713  2,773  1,850  4,417  3,639 
                           
IV. MULTISECTOR / CROSS-CUTTING  122  752  1,162  1,508  3,380  1,840  4,139  5,610  7,409  9,648  10,224  16,576  19,293 
IV.1. General Environment Protection  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  1,984  2,665  3,729  3,816  6,458 
IV.2. Other Multisector  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  2,131  6,570  6,496  12,734  12,835 
                           
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE  
(I + II + III + IV)  9,296  18,623  27,661  48,148  52,118  60,094  86,334  91,819  105,265  87,691  85,984  139,542  197,000 
                           
VI. COMMODITY AID / GENERAL 
PROGRAM ASSISTANCE  5,801  5,086  6,964  7,951  8,997  19,539  23,765  24,471  9,681  8,756  8,580  8,541  12,791 
VI.1. General Budget Support  –  –  –  –  –  364  2,489  3,387  2,241  1,445  800  2,229  8,806 
VI.2. Development Food Aid/Food 
Security Assistance  4,055  3,397  4,259  3,710  3,695  6,609  6,046  4,977  3,265  3,350  3,840  3,186  3,576 
VI.3. Other Commodity Assistance  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  1,548  2,647  3,949  3,126  408 
                           
VII. ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  1,317  947  2,097  2,736  1,047  2,188  15,877  16,034  12,544  11,016  14,109  50,041  42,818 
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Table A.3. Continued 
  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84  1985-87  1988-90  1991-93  1994-96  1997-99  2000-02  2003-05  2006-08 
                           
VIII. HUMANITARIAN AID  206  354  364  1,096  1,115  1,714  2,679  7,957  5,914  8,287  6,970  17,789  22,924 
VIII.1. Emergency Response  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  2,306  6,488  5,167  12,545  20,512 
VIII.2. Reconstruction Relief & 
Rehabilitation  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  1,471  1,930 
VIII.3. Disaster Prevention & 
Preparedness  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  8  483 
                           
IX. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF 
DONORS  –  –  –  –  920  3,614  5,254  5,007  7,363  7,821  8,440  11,341  14,705 
                           
X. SUPPORT TO NGO’S  –  –  –  –  1,066  2,092  1,932  2,160  1,403  2,250  5,465  4,724  7,554 
                           
XI. REFUGEES IN DONOR COUNTRIES  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  794  1,755  1,805  3,395  5,452  6,304 
                           
XII. UNALLOCATED / UNSPECIFIED  3,930  9,054  11,358  9,385  7,293  3,412  6,261  8,630  9,953  5,695  4,943  4,795  5,273 
                           
TOTAL  
(V + VI + VII + VIII + IX + X + XI + XII)  20,550  34,063  48,444  69,316  72,556  92,653  142,101  156,871  153,879  133,319  137,887  242,225  309,369 




  47 
Table A.4. DFID commitments, June 201030
Strong public backing: 
 
•  Continue to spend half of future direct support for developing countries on public services. 
•  Allocate at least 50 percent of all new bilateral aid to fragile and conflict-affected countries. 
•  Double support to global education, reaching £1 billion by 2010 as part of a commitment to spend at least £8.5 billion 
by 2015. 
•  Spend £6 billion on health services and systems by 2015. 
•  Quadruple support to fair and ethical trade. 
•  Support fair and ethical trade through public procurement. 
•  Support 50 million poor people through social assistance and related measures. 
•  Double our central support to civil society organizations to £300 million by 2013. 
•  Sustain increased support to water and sanitation to provide a total of £1 billion to Africa over five years. 
•  Expand support for southern civil society organizations to campaign for action on climate change and to deliver 
change on the ground. 
•  Work with international partners to ensure that at least US$10 billion is provided annually for infrastructure in Africa 
by 2010 through the Africa Infrastructure Consortium. 
•  In 2008, the United Kingdom committed £100 million over five years to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. 
•  Invest £220 million in health research over the next five years. 
•  Expand support for economic opportunities in fragile and postconflict countries. 
•  Support 8 million children in school in Africa by 2010. 
•  Help 25 million people gain access to water and sanitation in Africa over the next 5 years and 30 million people in 
South Asia by 2011. 
•  Concentrate our resources on poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia. 
•  Work more in those fragile states that receive less aid overall in relation to the number of poor people they have and 
which are most off track on the MDGs. 
•  Work in those middle-income countries that have the largest numbers of poor people and the greatest regional and 
global influence on development; maintain links with other middle-income countries (including through the EU) in 
order to help them avoid slipping back to low-income status. 
•  Encourage civil society and other organizations to monitor international donor performance in developing countries. 
•  Expand opportunities for young people and Diaspora communities to volunteer in developing countries. 
 
Strong backing by other government departments: 
•  Provide £1 billion per year to support growth and trade. 
•  Help countries plan and implement new climate-resilient development strategies through the Plot Program for 
Climate Resilience. 
•  Deliver on our commitments to invest in clean technology and renewable energy in developing countries through the 
Environmental Trust Fund. 
•  Pilot climate change innovation centers and seed funding for clean technology. 
•  Invest in research into climate science for better predictions of local impacts on poorer countries (partnership with 
the Hadley Centre). 
•  Produce a UK conflict strategy in 2009 to guide how we tackle conflict globally. 
•  By June 2010, develop joint government strategies in fragile countries where they do not already exist. 
 
 
   
                                                       
30 Commitments made in the earlier years, which were outstanding as of 2010.  
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Table A.4. Continued 
Unlikely to be noticed: 
•  Double the share of Africa funding for regional programs to £1 billion over next four years. 
•  Provide extra support to help developing countries strengthen regulation of their own financial sectors. 
•  Provide funding to establish a network of African Centres of Excellence. 
•  Double support to the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund. 
•  Provide advice on growth strategies for creating more jobs, on low carbon growth paths, and on the integration of 
climate concerns into future plans. 
•  Provide additional help to African regional organizations that offer technical support for credible elections. 
•  Build an international partnership to promote security and justice. 
•  Increase funding to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, contingent on its performance. 
•  Higher proportion of new resources to be spent multilaterally, in response to reforms. 
•  Push for EU aid budget resources to be reprioritized toward fragile countries in Asia and the Middle East. 
•  Make £50 million of this increased support available by April 2010. 
•  Offer new development innovation funding to support small-scale funding for UK individuals and communities active 
overseas. 
•  DFID has committed to double the support for agricultural research to £400 million (2008–2013). 
•  DFID has committed to support the 2009 G8 objective of reducing the global average cost of transferring remittances 
from 10 to 5 percent over the next 5 years. 
Source: Birch 2010. 
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Table A.5. OECD/DAC coverage of aid to agriculture and food security related aid  




Description  Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage 
     
Agricultural policy (grouping 1) 
31110  Agricultural policy and administrative 
management 
Agricultural sector policy, planning and programs; aid to 
agricultural ministries; institution capacity building and advice; 
unspecified agriculture. 
31130  Agricultural land resources  Including soil degradation control; soil improvement; drainage of 
water-logged areas; soil desalination; agricultural land surveys; 
land reclamation; erosion control, desertification control. 
31164  Agrarian reform  Including agricultural sector adjustment. 
Agricultural production (grouping 2) 
31120  Agricultural development  Integrated projects; farm development. 
31161  Foodcrop production  Including grains (wheat, rice, barley, maize, rye, oats, millet, 
sorghum); horticulture; vegetables; fruit and berries; other 
annual and perennial crops. [Use code 32161 for agroindustries.] 
31162  Industrial crops/export crops  Including sugar; coffee, cocoa, tea; oil seeds, nuts, kernels; fiber 
crops; tobacco; rubber. [Use code 32161 for agroindustries.] 
31163  Livestock  Animal husbandry; animal feed aid. 
31165  Agricultural alternative  Projects to reduce illicit drug cultivation through other 
agricultural marketing and production opportunities (see code 
43050 for nonagricultural alternative development). 
Agricultural water resources (grouping 3) 
31140  Agricultural water resources  Irrigation, reservoirs, hydraulic structures, ground water 
exploitation for agricultural use. 
Agricultural inputs (grouping 4) 
31150  Agricultural inputs  Supply of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural machinery/equipment. 
Agricultural education/research/services (grouping 5) 
31166  Agricultural extension  Nonformal training in agriculture. 
31181  Agricultural education/training   
31182  Agricultural research  Plant breeding, physiology, genetic resources, ecology, taxonomy, 
disease control, agricultural biotechnology; including livestock 
research (animal health, breeding and genetics, nutrition, 
physiology). 
31191  Agricultural services  Marketing policies and organizations; storage and 
transportation, creation of strategic reserves. 
31192  Plant and postharvest protection and pest 
control 
Including integrated plant protection, biological plant protection 
activities, supply and management of agrochemicals, supply of 
pesticides, plant protection policy and legislation. 
31193  Agricultural financial services  Financial intermediaries for the agricultural sector including 
credit schemes; crop insurance. 
31194  Agricultural cooperatives  Including farmers’ organizations. 
31195  Livestock/veterinary services  Animal health and management, genetic resources, feed 
resources. 
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Table A.5. Continued 




Description  Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage 
     
Forestry (grouping 6) 
31210  Forestry policy and administrative 
management 
Forestry sector policy, planning and programs; institution 
capacity building and advice; forestry surveys; unspecified 
forestry and agroforestry activities. 
31220  Forestry development  Aforestation for industrial and rural consumption; exploitation 
and utilization; erosion control, desertification control; 
integrated forestry projects. 
31261  Fuelwood/charcoal  Forestry development whose primary purpose is production of 
fuelwood and charcoal. 
31281  Forestry education/training   
31282  Forestry research  Including artificial regeneration, genetic improvement, 
production methods, fertilizer, harvesting. 
31291  Forestry services   
Fishing (grouping 7) 
31310  Fishing policy and administrative 
management 
Fishing sector policy, planning and programs; institution 
capacity building and advice; ocean and coastal fishing; marine 
and freshwater fish surveys and prospecting; fishing 
boats/equipment; unspecified fishing activities 
31320  Fishery development  Exploitation and utilization of fisheries; fish stock protection; 
aquaculture; integrated fishery projects. 
31381  Fishery education/training   
31382  Fishery research  Pilot fish culture; marine/freshwater biological research. 
31391  Fishery services  Fishing harbors; fish markets; fishery transport and cold storage. 
 




Description  Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage 
     
43040  Rural development  Integrated rural development projects—regional development 
planning; promotion of decentralized and multisectoral 
competence for planning, coordination and management; 
implementation of regional development and measures 
(including natural reserve management); land management; land 
use planning; land settlement and resettlement activities 
[excluding resettlement of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (72010)]; functional integration of rural and urban 
areas; geographical information systems. 
52010  Food aid/Food security  Supply of edible human food under national or international 
programs including transport costs; cash payments made for 
food supplies; project food aid and food aid for market sales 
when benefiting sector not specified; excluding emergency food 
aid. 
72040  Emergency food aid  Food aid normally for general free distribution or special 
supplementary feeding programs; short-term relief to targeted 
population groups affected by emergency situations. Excludes 
nonemergency food security assistance programs/food aid 
(52010). 
Source: OECD/DAC 2010.  
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